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Date: Tue, 4 Apr 2017 12:24:57 -0600
From: Kurt Seifried <kseifried@...hat.com>
To: oss-security <oss-security@...ts.openwall.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>, Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...gle.com>, 
	"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>, Alexey Kuznetsov <kuznet@....inr.ac.ru>, 
	James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>, Hideaki YOSHIFUJI <yoshfuji@...ux-ipv6.org>, 
	Patrick McHardy <kaber@...sh.net>, netdev <netdev@...r.kernel.org>, 
	LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, Vasily Kulikov <segoon@...nwall.com>, 
	Wade Mealing <wmealing@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: Linux kernel ping socket / AF_LLC connect()
 sin_family race

Assuming MITRE hasn't had a request for this yet, please use CVE-2017-2671
for this issue.

On Tue, Apr 4, 2017 at 9:20 AM, Marcus Meissner <meissner@...e.de> wrote:

> Hi,
>
> did anyone request a CVE yet?
>
> Ciao, Marcus
> On Sat, Mar 25, 2017 at 01:10:57AM +0100, Solar Designer wrote:
> > On Fri, Mar 24, 2017 at 03:21:06PM -0700, Eric Dumazet wrote:
> > > Looks easy enough to fix ?
> >
> > Oh.  Probably.  Thanks.  Need to test, but I guess you already did?
> >
> > > diff --git a/net/ipv4/ping.c b/net/ipv4/ping.c
> > > index
> > > 2af6244b83e27ae384e96cf071c10c5a89674804..
> ccfbce13a6333a65dab64e4847dd510dfafb1b43
> > > 100644
> > > --- a/net/ipv4/ping.c
> > > +++ b/net/ipv4/ping.c
> > > @@ -156,17 +156,18 @@ int ping_hash(struct sock *sk)
> > >  void ping_unhash(struct sock *sk)
> > >  {
> > >         struct inet_sock *isk = inet_sk(sk);
> > > +
> > >         pr_debug("ping_unhash(isk=%p,isk->num=%u)\n", isk,
> isk->inet_num);
> > > +       write_lock_bh(&ping_table.lock);
> > >         if (sk_hashed(sk)) {
> > > -               write_lock_bh(&ping_table.lock);
> > >                 hlist_nulls_del(&sk->sk_nulls_node);
> > >                 sk_nulls_node_init(&sk->sk_nulls_node);
> > >                 sock_put(sk);
> > >                 isk->inet_num = 0;
> > >                 isk->inet_sport = 0;
> > >                 sock_prot_inuse_add(sock_net(sk), sk->sk_prot, -1);
> > > -               write_unlock_bh(&ping_table.lock);
> > >         }
> > > +       write_unlock_bh(&ping_table.lock);
> > >  }
> > >  EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ping_unhash);
> >
> > FWIW, in Pavel's original implementation for 2.4.32 (unused), this was:
> >
> > static void ping_v4_unhash(struct sock *sk)
> > {
> >       DEBUG(("ping_v4_unhash(sk=%p,sk->num=%u)\n", sk, sk->num));
> >       write_lock_bh(&ping_hash_lock);
> >       if (sk->pprev) {
> >               if (sk->next)
> >                      sk->next->pprev = sk->pprev;
> >               *sk->pprev = sk->next;
> >               sk->pprev = NULL;
> >               sk->num = 0;
> >               sock_prot_dec_use(sk->prot);
> >               __sock_put(sk);
> >       }
> >       write_unlock_bh(&ping_hash_lock);
> > }
> >
> > Looks like the erroneous optimization (not expecting concurrent activity
> > on the same socket?) was introduced during conversion to 2.6's hlists.
> >
> > So far this cursed function had 3 bugs, two of them security (including
> > this one) and one probably benign (or if not, then effectively a subset
> > of this bug as it performed some unneeded / stale debugging work before
> > acquiring the lock), with all 3 introduced in forward-porting.  Maybe
> > the nature of forward-porting activity makes people relatively
> > inattentive ("compiles with the new interfaces and still works? must be
> > correct"), compared to when writing new code.
> >
> > Anyhow, I share some responsibility for this mess, for having advocated
> > this patch being forward-ported and merged back then.  I still like
> > having this functionality and its userspace security benefits... but I
> > don't like the kernel bugs.
> >
> > Alexander
> >
>
> --
> Marcus Meissner,SUSE LINUX GmbH; Maxfeldstrasse 5; D-90409 Nuernberg; Zi.
> 3.1-33,+49-911-740 53-432,,serv=loki,mail=wotan,type=real <
> meissner@...e.de>
>



-- 

Kurt Seifried -- Red Hat -- Product Security -- Cloud
PGP A90B F995 7350 148F 66BF 7554 160D 4553 5E26 7993
Red Hat Product Security contact: secalert@...hat.com

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