Follow @Openwall on Twitter for new release announcements and other news
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date: Tue, 14 Feb 2017 09:29:48 +0000 (UTC)
From: S├ębastien Delafond <>
Subject: Re: CVE request: XXE in Openpyxl

On 2017-02-14, Doran Moppert <> wrote:
> My mistake - thanks for bringing this up!
> It appears that resolve_entities=False (ie. options &=
> ~XML_PARSE_NOENT) does *not* affect the expansion of predefined
> entities or character entities.  See [1], [2] and parser.c +
> HTMLparser.c in libxml source.
> 1:
> 2:
> These flags *do* control the expansion of internal entities, but I
> expect that most common protocols and file formats should not rely on
> those - including Excel.  As long as openpyxl has no need to resolve
> internal entities, nor perform DTD validation, CVE-2016-9318 is not
> relevant and the proposed patch looks correct.
> So yes, the original CVE request was valid and should go ahead:

@MITRE, can you assign one directly, since this request pre-dates the
requirement of going through the web form, or should I resubmit there
anyway ?

>> the Debian Security Team would like to request a CVE for an XML XEE
>> discovered in Openpyxl by Marcin Ulikowski from F-Secure; Openpyxl
>> resolves external entities by default:
> Also:

> Sorry about muddying the water with misunderstanding(s).  The tricky
> part of CVE-2016-9318 seems to be particular requirements of
> components like xmlsec that want internal entity resolution without
> XXE, or DTD validation without exposing the whole filesystem.

No problem at all, the overall implications of CVE-2016-9318 and entity
resolution are indeed pretty complex.



Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Please check out the Open Source Software Security Wiki, which is counterpart to this mailing list.

Confused about mailing lists and their use? Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia and check out these guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.