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Date: Mon, 26 Sep 2016 19:24:44 +0200
From: up201407890@...nos.dcc.fc.up.pt
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: CVE-2016-7545 -- SELinux sandbox escape
Quoting "Jakub Wilk" <jwilk@...lk.net>:
> * up201407890@...nos.dcc.fc.up.pt, 2016-09-25, 13:49:
>> When executing a program via the SELinux sandbox, the nonpriv
>> session can escape to the parent session by using the TIOCSTI ioctl
>> to push characters into the terminal's input buffer, allowing an
>> attacker to escape the sandbox.
>
> Apparently every single program that tries to run stuff with reduced
> privileges falls through this trap.
>
> Are there any use cases for TIOCSTI other than producing exploits?
I had this discussion with Stanislav Brabec, from SUSE, a while ago.
http://marc.info/?l=util-linux-ng&m=145702209921574&w=2
"Just for curiosity, I just ran grep for TIOCSTI ioctl() over all
openSUSE sources. I got about 60 matches.
I analyzed use of some cases:
util-linux: used in agetty in wait_for_term_input()
kbd: contrib utility sti equal to tiocsti utility.
irda: Used by handle_scancode() to emulate input.
tcsh: Used in ed mode and in pushback().
emacs: Used in stuff_char() (putting char to be read from terminal)
...
It seems that TIOCSTI is used for:
- Read character, and if it does not match, put it back.
- Wait for character, than put it back for processing.
- Implementing a simple line editing."
So yes.
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