Date: Sun, 18 Sep 2016 11:45:33 -0400 (EDT) From: cve-assign@...re.org To: bfriesen@...ple.dallas.tx.us Cc: cve-assign@...re.org, oss-security@...ts.openwall.com Subject: Re: GraphicsMagick 1.3.25 fixes some security issues -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 > Date: Tue, 6 Sep 2016 20:50:23 -0500 (CDT) > Yesterday GraphicsMagick 1.3.25 was released. It fixes several > security issues: > 1. A last instance of CVE-2016-2317 (heap buffer overflow) in the MVG > rendering code (also impacts SVG). This problem was originally > reported by Gustavo Grieco. CVE does not support the concept of a different "instance" of an ID number that has different affected versions. For the aspect of the heap buffer overflow issue in MVG/SVG rendering that remained present in the 1.3.24 release (and was not fixed until 1.3.25), use CVE-2016-7446. This should be considered a clarification to the following NEWS excerpts: http://www.graphicsmagick.org/NEWS.html#may-30-2016 1.3.24 (May 30, 2016) SVG: Fixed heap and stack buffer overflows, as well as segmentation violations (CVE-2016-2317 and CVE-2016-2318). http://www.graphicsmagick.org/NEWS.html#september-5-2016 1.3.25 (September 5, 2016) SVG/MVG: Fix another case of CVE-2016-2317 (heap buffer overflow) in the MVG rendering code (also impacts SVG). > 2. A possible heap overflow of the EscapeParenthesis() function. > While I was not able to reproduce it for myself, the implementation is > replaced with a different algorithm. This problem was reported by > Gustavo Grieco. Use CVE-2016-7447. > 3. The Utah RLE reader did not validate that header information was > reasonable given the file size and so it could cause huge memory > allocations and/or consume huge amounts of CPU. This problem was > reported by Agostino Sarubbo. Use CVE-2016-7448. > 4. The TIFF reader had a bug pertaining to use of TIFFGetField() when > a 'count' value is returned. The bug caused a heap read overflow (due > to using strlcpy() to copy a possibly unterminated string) which could > allow an untrusted file to crash the software. >> Fix heap buffer read overflow while copying sized TIFF attributes. >> http://hg.code.sf.net/p/graphicsmagick/code/rev/eb58028dacf5 >>> https://blogs.gentoo.org/ago/2016/08/23/graphicsmagick-two-heap-based-buffer-overflow-in-readtiffimage-tiff-c/ >>> https://blogs.gentoo.org/ago/2016/09/07/graphicsmagick-null-pointer-dereference-in-magickstrlcpy-utility-c/ >>>> The problem was due to the definition of strlcpy() in that it is >>>> supposed to return the number of characters which would have been >>>> copied if the destination buffer was large enough. To satisfy this >>>> requirement, strlcpy() needs to continue scanning memory until it >>>> encounters a null byte in memory. >>>> >>>> The strlcpy() function has very nice properties but this weakness is >>>> something that developers need to be aware of. Use CVE-2016-7449 for all of these reported TIFF problems. The ultimate vulnerability was use of: strlcpy(attribute,text,Min(sizeof(attribute),(count+1))); three times in coders/tiff.c, where strlcpy is not an appropriate function choice for this type of scenario of untrusted-data copying. - -- CVE Assignment Team M/S M300, 202 Burlington Road, Bedford, MA 01730 USA [ A PGP key is available for encrypted communications at http://cve.mitre.org/cve/request_id.html ] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1 iQIcBAEBCAAGBQJX3rYOAAoJEHb/MwWLVhi2T8AP/2FLvqniHnnBY6teYw5BlnFI CfQhTDZnh9Y1/yKcHci9A3QPtcuNRkhpwTXIV3pBNsTLIm+/E+/q28YZzS+j9pzJ wdURRmR40Hg1fCztO+VRpoe2WTu1qwKiC7nVcnol2fGqtx+umy25Frtwo6TaQ6q6 D1YpbHwP4u5S91KX2dC3BStKY4jwgRtMCCOiojelKftvpxYu8oLXsVwBwKGOZPr9 Kk4SJiFdSKQrJzzZKB8srIwLkDjA8fXz3KV7nfSznt6TGwQyx0hMJdHm/bif9oVt ILZ6/IKXlAgN3z+gVdEhPaqzMjyUXskfiX1+8UZx2d9cumSlW9xbaQUBrdhIbC3w 6d0Mwcs/fG0zYULNpIiVCJrQFNjkAsIEL9wcEqaUoQmifXqgFZ4g1FPJi1xyjUNg hrkSOn4N/e2Y7LYlPgJeCUEjl+f00FA5/2rWSyk8V78vz5cLpFV5tQ2+5mRhXJCO mcmfo0TPeboyYidBXlLWj9BVPHSJySeylYdH6yHnhD1ZjC1C4gQVHhIcYezkFIiO KspZxgBpo+FC6uXnm4Pn3tR2o+XdgDvg8oe7pW4ZNb1lB6qMd90sMnWGIW+4XSWQ JQurAylyajRnZ0MN8pHR9fel++8aaIXqY/QK1JwUC3MIBZdwHs1OH6t2VBu4eNff Lk+EMJgP868wTRmhGWwK =DLQk -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
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