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Date: Fri, 19 Aug 2016 09:46:56 -0400 (EDT)
From: cve-assign@...re.org
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Cc: cve-assign@...re.org
Subject: Re: CVE request: MatrixSSL lack of RSA-CRT hardening

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>> Date: Mon, 27 Jun 2016 08:08:14 +0200

> MatrixSSL 3.8.3 comes with this fix:
> 
> https://github.com/matrixssl/matrixssl/blob/master/CHANGES.md#validation-of-rsa-signature-creation
> 
> I think this warrants a CVE ID because RSA-CRT key leaks from
> MatrixSSL have been observed in practice.

>> Version 3.8.3 April 2016
>> 
>> BUG FIXES
>> 
>> Validation of RSA Signature Creation

>> An internal RSA validation of created signatures has been added to the
>> library in the psRsaEncryptPriv() function.
>> 
>> Security researcher Florian Weimer has shown it is possible for RSA
>> private key information to leak under some special failure
>> circumstances. Information on the exploit can be found here:
>> https://people.redhat.com/~fweimer/rsa-crt-leaks.pdf
>> 
>> The potential leak is only possible if a DHE_RSA based cipher suite is
>> supported on the server side. This is the only handshake combination
>> in which an RSA signature is sent over the wire (during the
>> SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE message). The signature itself must have been
>> incorrectly generated for the exploit to be possible.
>> 
>> The additional signature validation test will now cause the TLS
>> handshake to fail prior to a faulty signature being sent to the
>> client.

Use CVE-2016-6882.

- -- 
CVE Assignment Team
M/S M300, 202 Burlington Road, Bedford, MA 01730 USA
[ A PGP key is available for encrypted communications at
  http://cve.mitre.org/cve/request_id.html ]
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