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Date: Mon,  1 Aug 2016 19:49:02 -0400 (EDT)
From: cve-assign@...re.org
To: sbauer@...donthack.me
Cc: cve-assign@...re.org, oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: CVE Request: Linux >= 4.5 double fetch leading to heap overflow

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> Some code was moved from btrfs to the generic vfs ioctl:
> https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/fs/ioctl.c?h=v4.5&id=54dbc15172375641ef03399e8f911d7165eb90fb
> 
> During the port a double fetch with userland was introduced which can lead to an undersized allocation and subsequent heap overflow
> with potentially controlled data. It has been patched in upstream here:
> 
> https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=10eec60ce79187686e052092e5383c99b4420a20

>> vfs: ioctl: prevent double-fetch in dedupe ioctl
>> 
>> This prevents a double-fetch from user space that can lead to to an
>> undersized allocation and heap overflow.

> I attempted to write an exploit for this but that's not really my forte. I feel like this bug
> has the potential for a workable user->root exploit but I couldn't do it.
> 
> 1: You can control which cache the overflow happens on. I picked the same cache as the File struct.
> 2: the code writes 2 different width zeros past the allocation, one 32 bit and the other 64 bit.
> 3: I attempted to overflow and write the 32 bit 0 to the top half of a pointer so it would point to userland,
> but I couldn't find a suitable structure to overflow into.

> pthread_create(&race_car, NULL, size_change, range);

Use CVE-2016-6516.

- -- 
CVE Assignment Team
M/S M300, 202 Burlington Road, Bedford, MA 01730 USA
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  http://cve.mitre.org/cve/request_id.html ]
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