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Date: Thu, 21 Jul 2016 09:48:06 -0400 (EDT)
From: cve-assign@...re.org
To: lucian@...ocar.com
Cc: cve-assign@...re.org, oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: CVE Request: uclibc-ng (and uclibc): ARM arch: code execution

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http://www.uclibc-ng.org/ says "History ... uClibc-ng is a spin-off of
uClibc."

> This was fixed in version 1.0.16
> http://repo.or.cz/uclibc-ng.git/commit/e3848e3dd64a8d6437531488fe341354bc02eaed
> http://mailman.uclibc-ng.org/pipermail/devel/2016-July/001067.html

>> libc/string/arm/memset.S

>> bugfix: ARM: memset.S: use unsigned comparisons
>> 
>> The 'BLT' instruction checks for *signed* values. So if a3, length
>> parameter of memset, is negative, then value added to the PC will be
>> large.
>> 
>> memset(buf, 0xaa, 0xffff0000) triggers the bug.


> http://mailman.uclibc-ng.org/pipermail/devel/2016-May/000890.html
> 
> an attacker that controls the length parameter of
> the `memset' can also control the value of the PC register. The issue is
> similar to CVE-2011-2702.

>> The attack is a bit unrealistic, as it requires that the
>> application that uses uClibc allows a user to control a memory chunk
>> larger than 2GB.

> denial of service proof of concept
> 
> http://article.gmane.org/gmane.comp.lib.uclibc-ng/27

Use CVE-2016-6264.

- -- 
CVE Assignment Team
M/S M300, 202 Burlington Road, Bedford, MA 01730 USA
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