Follow @Openwall on Twitter for new release announcements and other news
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <56C649A7.7080105@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 18 Feb 2016 16:45:59 -0600
From: Austin English <austinenglish@...il.com>
To: cve-assign@...re.org, oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: Re: CVE request for wget

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256

On 12/24/2015 12:05 PM, Austin English wrote:
> On Tue, Nov 3, 2015 at 10:19 PM, Austin English
> <austinenglish@...il.com> wrote:
>> And 1.7 is now out as well: 
>> https://tails.boum.org/news/version_1.7/index.en.html
>> 
>> With the fix included and documented
>> 
>> On Mon, Nov 2, 2015 at 2:37 AM, Austin English
>> <austinenglish@...il.com> wrote:
>>> 
>>> The fix has been released in 1.7-rc1, 
>>> https://tails.boum.org/news/test_1.7-rc1/index.en.html
>>> 
>>> On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 3:21 PM, Austin English
>>> <austinenglish@...il.com> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>> On Thu, Oct 1, 2015 at 6:10 PM, Seth Arnold
>>>> <seth.arnold@...onical.com> wrote:
>>>>> On Thu, Oct 01, 2015 at 06:57:26PM -0400,
>>>>> cve-assign@...re.org wrote:
>>>>>> If there is any additional Tails vulnerability related to
>>>>>> this, another CVE ID may be needed. For example,
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/bug-wget/2015-08/msg00050.html
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> 
says
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> to be 100% sure, you should add --passive-ftp to your
>>>>>> command line. If you don't do that, your /etc/wgetrc or
>>>>>> ~/.wgetrc could include --no-passive-ftp (or passiveftp =
>>>>>> off).
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> If Tails is supposed to try to ensure that, perhaps
>>>>>> there's a requirement to have something like:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> alias wget="wget --passive-ftp"
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> in a system-wide location (possibly /etc/bash.bashrc).
>>>>>> The concept of CVE IDs for "failure of a torify step"
>>>>>> issues is new, and we aren't sure of the best approach.
>>>>> 
>>>>> I suspect using a bash alias in a site-wide config might
>>>>> then qualify for another CVE in the future, along the lines
>>>>> of "programs that spawn wget via system(3), popen(3), or
>>>>> exec family of functions can use unsafe active mode by
>>>>> accident". If Tails is in the business of fixing these
>>>>> things for safety, removing active ftp support from tools
>>>>> seems like better fix.
>>>>> 
>>>>> Thanks
>>>> 
>>>> A fix has been applied to Tails git:
>>>> 
>>>> https://labs.riseup.net/code/projects/tails/repository/revisions/b9
fd6312435d55dd0bc0b6abdb7994da4d66e2b2
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> 
In short, the wget binary is moved to /usr/lib/wget/wget, and a
>>>> wrapper script is put in place in /usr/bin/wget. The wrapper
>>>> ensures that wget is called via torsocks, and additionally,
>>>> also forces --passive-ftp.
>>>> 
>>>> Moving wget to /usr/lib/wget/wget gets the potentially
>>>> dangerous wget binary out of $PATH. A dedicated attacker
>>>> could check if /usr/bin/wget is a script and then parse it to
>>>> find the actual binary, but that would need to be a very
>>>> dedicated attacker and at that point, there are more feasible
>>>> attacks available.
> 
> This CVE has been fixed in a released version for quite some time, 
> what is needed to get this published/resolved?

Ping.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v2
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=m327
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Please check out the Open Source Software Security Wiki, which is counterpart to this mailing list.

Confused about mailing lists and their use? Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia and check out these guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.