Follow @Openwall on Twitter for new release announcements and other news
[<prev] [next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date: Tue, 1 Dec 2015 10:11:28 +0900
From: Philip Pettersson <>
Subject: CVE-2015-5273 + CVE-2015-5287, abrt local root in Centos/Fedora/RHEL


Here's a slightly delayed advisory about CVE-2015-5273 and CVE-2015-5287 that
I reported to Redhat in September. The patches were released on 2015-11-23.

These are issues concerning the abrt crash handling ecosystem in
Redhat-based distros.

I've attached two local root exploits for CentOS 7.1/Fedora 22 and RHEL 7.0/7.1.


A) CVE-2015-5287 (?), Insecure temporary directory and symlink usage
in sosreport
B) CVE-2015-5273, Insecure temporary directory usage in
C) CVE-2015-5287, Insecure symlink handling in abrt-hook-ccpp

A can be used to elevate privileges from an unprivileged user to root
on a default installation of RHEL 7/7.1. RHEL 6 and lower do not seem
vulnerable by default.

B can be used to create symlinks and files at arbitrary locations as
the abrt user. This only works on non-redhat systems such as CentOS 7 or
RHEL installations that do not use the official RHN yum repositories.

C can be used to elevate privileges from the abrt user to root.

B combined with C can be used to gain root from an unprivileged user.

Insecure temporary directory and symlink usage in sosreport, CVE-2015-5287 (?)

Redhat did not give a separate CVE for this issue so it falls under
I suppose.

When a process receives SIGSEGV, abrt will save diagnostic information in
/var/tmp/abrt/ccpp-*$pid on RHEL 7. Unless /etc/abrt/abrt.conf contains
the line "PrivateReports = yes", directories created here by abrt will be
chown()'d to the user who owned the crashing process. After saving some
initial information it will call post-create scripts, one of the default
ones on RHEL is /usr/sbin/sosreport.

/usr/sbin/sosreport will be invoked as root and work with a temporary
directory named /var/tmp/abrt/ccpp-*$pid/sosreport-$hostname-$date.
It will save a number of files collected from the system in this directory
and then archive it. Since the directory is owned by root we cannot
modify files inside it while sosreport is running, but we do own the parent
directory and can simply rename the temporary directory and make a new one.

sosreport will then write files into our crafted temp directory and will
follow any symlinks we make inside. By also renaming some of the temporary
files that sosreport works with we can exploit sosreport to write a file
with crafted data at an arbitrary location as root.

See for an exploit demonstrating this vulnerability.

I confirmed that RHEL 7 and 7.1 are vulnerable by default. RHEL 6 systems
will be vulnerable if the system administrator has commented out the line
"PrivateReports = yes" or set it to "no" in abrt.conf

Insecure temporary directory usage in
abrt-action-install-debuginfo-to-abrt-cache, CVE-2015-5273

abrt-action-install-debuginfo-to-abrt-cache is a wrapper for
with the setuid bit for userid abrt. By default it creates a temporary
directory in
/var/tmp/abrt-tmp-debuginfo-RANDOM_SUFFIX and downloads debug rpm
files to this location
before extracting them to /var/cache/abrt-di. The random suffix is not
quite random but in fact
highly predictable, and we can create this directory before executing
the suid wrapper.

By controlling the "unpacked.cpio" file we can trick
abrt-action-install-debuginfo into extracting
a cpio file that we control. By extracting two carefully created cpio
archives we can leverage
this to create files or symlinks anywhere on the file system as the abrt user.

Insecure symlink handling in abrt-hook-ccpp, CVE-2015-5287

If a program starting with the name "abrt" crashes, abrt-hook-ccpp
will write the coredump to
/var/tmp/abrt/$filename-coredump or /var/spool/abrt/$filename-coredump.
>From abrt-hook-ccpp.c:

    if (last_slash && strncmp(++last_slash, "abrt", 4) == 0)
        /* If abrtd/abrt-foo crashes, we don't want to create a _directory_,
         * since that can make new copy of abrtd to process it,
         * and maybe crash again...
         * Unlike dirs, mere files are ignored by abrtd.
        if (snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/%s-coredump",
g_settings_dump_location, last_slash) >= sizeof(path))
            error_msg_and_die("Error saving '%s': truncated long file
path", path);

        int abrt_core_fd = xopen3(path, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0600);

The call to xopen3() does not include the flag O_NOFOLLOW and is
therefore vulnerable to a symlink
attack. We can use the following steps to exploit this:

1. Create a symlink to /proc/sys/kernel/modprobe from
    * Note that we can use the previous vulnerability to achieve this
since the abrt root
      directory can be written to as the abrt user.
2. Execute a binary at /tmp/abrt-test and send it SIGSEGV
3. abrt-hook-ccpp will write the memory contents of the crashed
process to /proc/sys/kernel/modprobe

See for an example exploit for this.

This bug is also exploitable on RHEL installations if the system is
configured to use non-RHN yum
repositories. This is because yum is normally not usable by non-root
users if the only configured
repositories are RHN.


Philip Pettersson

View attachment "" of type "text/x-python" (2757 bytes)

View attachment "" of type "text/x-python" (7361 bytes)

Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Please check out the Open Source Software Security Wiki, which is counterpart to this mailing list.

Confused about mailing lists and their use? Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia and check out these guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.