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Date: Thu, 05 Nov 2015 17:30:14 +0100
To: "" <>
Cc: "" <>
Subject: Re: Re: CVE request: libsndfile 1.0.25 heap overflow

Hello list.

03.11.2015, 21:02, "" <>:
>>  Unrelated, but I recently reported an out of bounds triggered by the
>>  test suite of libsndfile and got no reply:
>>  Out of bounds reads in psf_strlcpy_crlf when running test suite
>>  AddressSanitizer: global-buffer-overflow ... READ of size 1
> Use CVE-2015-8075.

I have followed up on this to spot the root cause of what has been assigned CVE-2015-8075; as recommended by Hanno, I am sharing my results with the wider audience.

The `test_psf_strlcpy_crlf()` routine, as it is presented [1] in version 1.0.25, is incorrect in that it supplies an invalid argument value to the function `psf_strlcpy_crlf()` being tested: the last argument `srcmax` receives `sizeof(src)`, which is the size of the pointer `src`, and not the source string length it points to, as might have been anticipated by the author. Since the reporter tested a 64-bit build, `srcmax` gets passed 8, but the string is 7 bytes long. This triggers OOB access detected by address sanitizer, just like in the original report.

At this point, it seems CVE-2015-8075 has to be rejected as there is no vulnerability, only a poorly written test case which doesn't see any action except when running `make check`.

Note: Apparently, the vendor has attempted to fix the test [2], but it seems like `srcmax` is getting `sizeof(char)` instead of `sizeof(char *)` now. The test remains invalid, although due to a different reason.



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