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Date: Thu, 15 Oct 2015 12:58:50 -0400 (EDT)
From: cve-assign@...re.org
To: wmealing@...hat.com
Cc: cve-assign@...re.org, oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: CVE Request - Linux kernel - securelevel/secureboot bypass.
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Hash: SHA256
> When the kernel was booted with UEFI Secure Boot enabled, securelevel
> is set. If kexec (either through crash or admin action) is then used
> to load the same kernel, after reboot securelevel is disabled. In this
> state, the system is missing the protections provided by securelevel,
> for example kexec may be used to load an unsigned kernel via the
> legacy system call kexec_load.
>
> In the securelevel patchset, the state of UEFI Secure Boot is queried
> in the EFI stub, and sets a boot_params flag to indicate the state of
> UEFI Secure Boot. This flag is then used in setup_arch() to determine
> the correct state of securelevel. If the kernel is not booted via the
> EFI stub, securelevel is not set even if UEFI Secure Boot is enabled.
>
> TLDR: this allows a bypass the security mechanism of
> securelevel/secureboot combination.
>
> This patchset affects Red Hat specific kernels as secureboot is not
> fully fully implemented upstream yet.
As far as we can tell, you are reporting an issue in functionality
that was developed for a Red Hat product. Because identical
functionality is not currently offered elsewhere, a CVE ID can be
assigned without considering the details of the securelevel behavior
that may later be implemented (or considered optimal) outside of Red
Hat. In other words, within (at least) the Red Hat product, "If the
kernel is not booted via the EFI stub, securelevel is not set even if
UEFI Secure Boot is enabled" is unquestionably incorrect behavior.
Use CVE-2015-7837.
- --
CVE assignment team, MITRE CVE Numbering Authority
M/S M300
202 Burlington Road, Bedford, MA 01730 USA
[ PGP key available through http://cve.mitre.org/cve/request_id.html ]
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