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Date: Thu, 17 Sep 2015 10:25:30 -0400 (EDT)
From: cve-assign@...re.org
To: me@...tinbull.ca
Cc: cve-assign@...re.org, oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: CVE Request: TOTP Replay Attack in Ruby library "devise-two-factor"

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Hash: SHA256

> Date: Sun, 6 Sep 2015 11:55:41 -0400

> Given an attacker already knows a victim's credentials, they could
> "shoulder surf" the victim's second factor device, obtaining the OTP,
> and login with the known credentials & OTP within the current
> time-step (a default 30 second window). This defeats two-factor
> authentication for the duration of the time-step.

This 2015-09-06 message is directly related to a discussion of CVE
assignment here on 2015-06-22, but doesn't mention that that
discussion had occurred. Specifically:

  http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2015/06/22/2

  From: cve-assign@...re.org

  devise-two-factor can potentially have a CVE ID. As you mentioned, the
  attack surface is somewhat narrow, and it might make more sense to see
  how the devise-two-factor vendor announces the update. For example, if
  the vendor makes a code change to prevent multiple submissions and
  describes the code change as resolving a vulnerability, then there can
  be a CVE ID.

The vendor did all of that, so we're assigning CVE-2015-7225.

[ relevant parts include 'to protect against "shoulder-surfing" attacks' in
https://github.com/tinfoil/devise-two-factor/blob/master/UPGRADING.md and
'While a valid security issue, this is a very narrow vulnerability' in
https://github.com/tinfoil/devise-two-factor/issues/45#issuecomment-139335608 ]

- -- 
CVE assignment team, MITRE CVE Numbering Authority
M/S M300
202 Burlington Road, Bedford, MA 01730 USA
[ PGP key available through http://cve.mitre.org/cve/request_id.html ]
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