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Date: Wed, 15 Apr 2015 05:45:44 -0400 (EDT)
From: Jakub Filak <>
Subject: Re: Problems in automatic crash analysis frameworks


I have a question regarding the ABRT vulnerabilities. I don't particularly understand how an attacker can use /proc/pid/exe symlink to force ABRT to read an arbitrary file if the symlink cannot be changed and kernel refuses to create the process if the symlink's target is not executable.

> This code trusts the /proc/pid/exe symlink, even though it is possible
> to link it anywhere you want.
>        sprintf(buf, "/proc/%lu/exe", (long)pid);
>        int src_fd_binary = open(buf, O_RDONLY); /* might fail and
>                                                    return -1, it's ok */

Thank you for clarifying this for me.

Kind regards,

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