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Message-ID: <552D93A8.4050007@canonical.com>
Date: Tue, 14 Apr 2015 18:24:40 -0400
From: Marc Deslauriers <marc.deslauriers@...onical.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
CC: Assign a CVE Identifier <cve-assign@...re.org>, 
 security <security@...ntu.com>
Subject: Re: Re: Problems in automatic crash analysis frameworks

Hi,

On 2015-04-14 05:10 PM, Tavis Ormandy wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 14, 2015 at 2:08 PM, Tavis Ormandy <taviso@...gle.com> wrote:
>> On Tue, Apr 14, 2015 at 1:35 PM, Tavis Ormandy <taviso@...gle.com> wrote:
>>> On Tue, Apr 14, 2015 at 9:02 AM, Marc Deslauriers
>>> <marc.deslauriers@...onical.com> wrote:
>>>> Hi,
>>>>
>>>> On 2015-04-14 11:55 AM, cve-assign@...re.org wrote:
>>>>> This is mostly a question for the persons who assigned CVE-2015-1318
>>>>> and CVE-2015-1862. Should these CVE assignments be interpreted to
>>>>> mean:
>>>>>
>>>>>   CVE-2015-1318 - in Apport, an unprivileged user can use a
>>>>>                   namespace-based attack because there is an execve by
>>>>>                   root after a chroot into a user-specified directory
>>>>
>>>> Yes, I assigned CVE-2015-1318 to that specific issue in Apport.
>>>>
>>>> Marc.
>>>
>>> It looks like this is the patch for Apport:
>>>
>>> http://bazaar.launchpad.net/~apport-hackers/apport/trunk/revision/2943#data/apport
>>>
>>> It's far more complicated than I expected, and not obviously correct.
>>> It could probably use some review, I'll think about it today.
>>>
>>> Tavis.
>>
>> Wait, my first thought is that it's not obvious to me that
>> /proc/net/unix is guaranteed to be newline delimited, newline is a
>> perfectly valid name in a filename, no?
>>
>>>>> import socket
>>>>> socket.socket(socket.AF_UNIX, socket.SOCK_STREAM).bind('test\ntest')
>>>>> sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_UNIX, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
>>>>> sock.bind('/tmp/foo\nbar')
>>>>> sock.listen(1)
>>
>> $ grep -A1 foo /proc/net/unix
>> 0000000000000000: 00000002 00000000 00010000 0001 01 4772228 /tmp/foo
>> bar
> 
> And with complete control over this line, it seems like it's game over.
> 
>                 container = lxc.Container(path[-2], real_path)
> 
> I'm calling this re-broken.
> 
> Tavis.
> 

Nice!

Can we get a CVE assigned for this, please?

Thanks,

Marc.

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