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Date: Mon, 23 Mar 2015 11:38:54 +0100
From: Marcus Meissner <meissner@...e.de>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: CVE for Kali Linux
On Sun, Mar 22, 2015 at 11:34:28PM +0300, Alexander Cherepanov wrote:
> On 2015-03-22 20:23, Solar Designer wrote:
> >https does offer a security aspect that signatures don't: it hides from
> >some observers which exact software is being downloaded (and maybe that
> >it's a software download at all). It doesn't do that perfectly because
> >the target address and transfer timings and sizes may be revealing, but
> >I do acknowledge there's some subtle improvement over http here. I just
> >think this is far less important than ensuring authenticity of the
> >software. So let's demand signatures and signature verification first,
> >and let's not be distracted by http vs. https.
>
> There are some attacks even if you verify signatures, e.g. serving
> old, known-vulnerable versions. HTTPS can help here (until
> signatures start to be widely accompanied by expiring timestamps or
> something).
SUSE has added an expiry tag in the YUM metadata for such cases.
Ciao, Marcus
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