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Date: Fri, 20 Mar 2015 10:12:19 -0600
From: Kurt Seifried <kseifried@...hat.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: membership request to the closed linux-distros
security mailing list
On 03/20/2015 09:55 AM, Marcus Meissner wrote:
> On Fri, Mar 20, 2015 at 08:54:29AM -0700, Anthony Liguori wrote:
>> On Fri, Mar 20, 2015 at 8:50 AM, Stuart Henderson <stu@...cehopper.org> wrote:
>>> On 2015/03/20 08:16, Anthony Liguori wrote:
>>>>
>>>> I think the alternative is to formalize what already appears to be the
>>>> existing practice: disclose distros@ on the existence of a
>>>> vulnerability but require direct contact for the details of the
>>>> vulnerability if the submitter/upstream thinks the impact is high.
>>>
>>> Are private lists even needed if this policy is taken?
>>
>> I think there's a lot of value in being able to just send a low-medium
>> impact issue to a single list of groups that have gone through some
>> level of vetting without needing to respond directly to individuals
>> and making value judgements.
>>
>> I also think it's helpful to have a single point of contact so that an
>> upstream isn't dealing with 10 different people from a single
>> organization asking for details.
>
> Why not just publishing a low - medium impact vulnerability directly?
>
> Embargoe handling alwas also has some overhead , which is not necessary in such cases.
>
> Ciao, Marcus
Agreed 100%, we're changing from the old default of "everything should
be embargoed unless it can be public" to "everything should be public
unless it must be embargoed" (and ideally a short embargo like this
weeks OpenSSL one). It creates a LOT less work. Especially with the
prevalence of GitHub which has no concept of private issues/commits, so
fixing things privately means you have to work outside of your normal
workflow which is insane for anything that isn't important/critical.
--
Kurt Seifried -- Red Hat -- Product Security -- Cloud
PGP A90B F995 7350 148F 66BF 7554 160D 4553 5E26 7993
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