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Date: Mon, 23 Feb 2015 10:37:59 +0100
From: Sven Schwedas <>
Subject: Re: Re: CVE request: BD-J implementation in libbluray

On 2015-02-23 10:34, Jean-Baptiste Kempf wrote:
> On 23 Feb, Florian Weimer wrote :
>>> As for
>>> "Fixing it would not change anything. Xlet (that requests the mount, or is
>>> being executed from the mount) could as well uncompress the files by self
>>> where it wants, even download other files from internet."
>>> So, maybe you want to have a full Xlet sandboxing? Or is it something
>>> else?
>> Yes, I do think full sandboxing is required because content publishers
>> have attacked end user system integrity in the past, so I don't think
>> they can be trusted.
> BD-J code comes from Blu-Rays. Downloading non-official blurays and
> executing it is like taking random binaries from internet and running
> them.

And the Sony rootkit came from official, store-bought discs …

> Patches are welcome, though...
> With my kindest regards,

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