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Date: Sat, 14 Feb 2015 07:09:54 +0100
From: Steffen Rösemann <steffen.roesemann1986@...il.com>
To: cve-assign@...re.org
Cc: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: CVE-Request -- Landsknecht Adminsystems v.4.0.1 (DEV, beta version) -- Reflecting XSS, unrestricted file-upload and underlaying CSRF

> We think this means anyone can execute a file regardless of who
> uploaded it. Do you mean that a file uploaded by a user can ONLY be
> executed by an administrator or different user, whereas a file
> uploaded by an administrator can ONLY be executed by a user?


I mean that anyone can execute files, regardless of who uploaded it.

> So, we think one CVE for the two XSS issues, and one CVE for file
> upload, is the correct number. Do you have another interpretation?

No, I follow your interpretation. Thank you very much.

Greetings.

> Am 14.02.2015 um 01:21 schrieb cve-assign@...re.org:
> 
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA1
> 
>> As there seems not be an existing permission-model, users can read/execute
>> files  an administrator/user uploaded and vice versa.
> 
> We think this means anyone can execute a file regardless of who
> uploaded it. Do you mean that a file uploaded by a user can ONLY be
> executed by an administrator or different user, whereas a file
> uploaded by an administrator can ONLY be executed by a user?
> 
>> This issue includes an underlaying CSRF-vulnerability, as a user is able to
>> upload a malicious file and trick another user or the administrator into
>> visiting the link to the file.
> 
> We're not sure whether you mean the CSRF concept is relevant in a way
> that is unusual for an "upload arbitrary files" issue.
> 
> If the attacker can upload a file, with the upload location and/or
> file extension allowing execute access, then the typical outcome is
> that exactly that file is executed. It is not typically the case that
> a product modifies uploaded files to insert a CSRF protection
> mechanism. Also, it is not typically the case that a pathname such as
> /upload/files/{UPLOADED_FILE} would actually execute a wrapper program
> (containing a CSRF protection mechanism) before executing
> UPLOADED_FILE itself.
> 
> For these reasons, the ability to upload executable files to
> /upload/files/{UPLOADED_FILE} would normally be considered a single
> vulnerability, and would not lead to a conclusion that the product has
> an independent CSRF problem.
> 
> Also, the primary threat model for "upload arbitrary files" issues is
> that the file uploading and the file execution are done by the same
> person. Certainly, it could be interesting to upload JavaScript code
> and trick an administrator into executing it. However, if the attacker
> can upload and execute PHP code without any tricking, ability to
> upload JavaScript is usually not considered an independently relevant
> problem. In common (but not all) cases, given an attacker's "upload
> arbitrary files" ability, the entire class of scenarios in which the
> file is later executed by a different person isn't independently
> relevant.
> 
> So, we think one CVE for the two XSS issues, and one CVE for file
> upload, is the correct number. Do you have another interpretation?
> 
> - -- 
> CVE assignment team, MITRE CVE Numbering Authority
> M/S M300
> 202 Burlington Road, Bedford, MA 01730 USA
> [ PGP key available through http://cve.mitre.org/cve/request_id.html ]
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