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Date: Thu, 12 Feb 2015 11:54:05 -0500 (EST)
From: cve-assign@...re.org
To: kristian.fiskerstrand@...ptuouscapital.com
Cc: cve-assign@...re.org, oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: CVE Request: Cups: cupsRasterReadPixels buffer overflow

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> https://www.cups.org/str.php?L4551

> A malformed compressed raster file can trigger a buffer overflow in
> cupsRasterReadPixels.

>> causes count (which is unsigned) to wrap around

> I can confirm that that patch fixes the buffer overflow

Use CVE-2014-9679 for this integer overflow that was fixed in 2.0.2.

The scope of this CVE does not include the "nothing that guarantees
that r->bpp is non-zero" observation the "Feb 1, 2015" comment.

> since compression isn't used between filters and since we use
> sandboxing whenever possible, it is unlikely that this will be
> exploitable

This isn't directly relevant to whether a CVE should exist, but
http://cups.org/documentation.php/doc-2.0/man-cups-files.conf.html
mentions 'Specifies the level of security sandboxing that is applied
to print filters, backends, and other child processes of the
scheduler. The default is "strict". This directive is currently only
used/supported on OS X.' Apparently some online discussions of CUPS
include third-party recommendations to disable sandboxing.

- -- 
CVE assignment team, MITRE CVE Numbering Authority
M/S M300
202 Burlington Road, Bedford, MA 01730 USA
[ PGP key available through http://cve.mitre.org/cve/request_id.html ]
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