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Date: Sat, 20 Dec 2014 13:54:13 -0500
From: Daniel Micay <>
Subject: Re: can we talk about secure time?

On 20/12/14 12:47 PM, wrote:
> On 20/12/14 03:27, Hanno Böck wrote:
>> A strange discussion. Because ntp is insecure by design. It is an
>> unauthenticated, insecure protocol that is suspectible to
>> man-in-the-middle-attacks. Frankly, I don't care which implementation
>> of an insecure protocol has less buffer overflows.
> How broken are the authentication methods already present in ntpd?[1]
> So far there appears to be only DES/MD5 keys, and with autokey, RSA/DH
> (but apparently autokey doesn't work behind NAT?)
> As far as I know, distros don't typically set these up, would it be
> worth it to enable and improve on these, or just make something new?
> Considering OSes already set up their own ntp pools[2], they could also
> provide their own trusted keys in their ntpd packages.
> [1]
> [2] (ubuntu|openbsd|debian|netbsd|fedora)

Those operating systems don't actually have their own NTP pools. They
are just vendor zones hitting the same pool. The resources put
into it amount it asking for a vendor zone and they only do it
because upstream kindly asks for it (perhaps for metrics):

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