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Date: Sun, 07 Dec 2014 23:27:31 +0100
From: Lionel Debroux <lionel_debroux@...oo.fr>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: How GNU/Linux distros deal with offset2lib attack?

> > > > And of course a distro could backport and maintain it, it's a
> > > > very tiny patch, much smaller than what they normall backport.
> > > > Take it up with the distros if you want this.
> > Tiny indeed. I'm surprised how few hunks it contains, given that
> > PAX_ASLR involves
> > $ grep CONFIG_PAX_ASLR pax-linux-3.17.4-test7.patch | wc -l
> > 25
> > hunks.
> 
> That's not a good comparison, as who knows what those config options
> do.
>
> And a "well written" option will never have a CONFIG_* option within
> the .c files, as that's not the normal way to implement features in
> the Linux kernel.
Most occurrences of CONFIG_PAX_ASLR are in headers.

1) struct mm_struct in include/linux/mm_types.h is grown by 3 unsigned
longs under CONFIG_PAX_ASLR's control, at the end of the structure:

+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_NOEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_ASLR)
+	unsigned long pax_flags;
+#endif
[...]
+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR
+	unsigned long delta_mmap;		/* randomized offset */
+	unsigned long delta_stack;		/* randomized offset */
+#endif

Hector Marco's patch adds an unsigned long in there, too, but in the
middle of the structure.

2) snippets similar to the following one are added to multiple
arch/*/include/asm/elf.h
+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR
+#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE	0x00008000UL
+
+#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN	((current->personality == PER_LINUX_32BIT) ?
16 : 10)
+#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN	((current->personality == PER_LINUX_32BIT)
? 16 : 10)
+#endif
(this one is for ARM).

3) CONFIG_PAX_ASLR also appears:
    * when initializing the new fields in struct mm (Hector Marco's
patch does it as well, of course);
    * when modifying the PaX flags according to information embedded
into ELF files or the corresponding xattrs;
    * in proc_pid_status();
    * for a getter/setter pair for mm->pax_flags.

> > Is Hector Marco's ASLRv3 submission a much simpler reinvention of
> > PaX's ASLR wheel, or is it rather a smaller wheel which does less
> > than PaX's improved, field-tested ASLR does ?
> 
> I don't know, never looked at the PaX code, sorry.  Why not look at
> it yourself and compare it?
In fact, I started doing so after sending my previous e-mail, before
receiving yours :)

CONFIG_PAX_ASLR provides the foundation for the three main randomization
options PAX_RANDKSTACK, PAX_RANDUSTACK and most of all, PAX_RANDMMAP,
where most of the action is (increasing the entropy and range of ASLR).
The snippets which use mm->delta_mmap and mm->delta_stack are mostly
under CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP.

Some of the snippets which seem to be associated with the improved
randomization aren't under config options, e.g. the replacement of
open-coded (!vma || addr + len <= vma->vm_start) checks by
check_heap_stack_gap(vma, addr, len) calls to an out of line function
which reads:

bool check_heap_stack_gap(const struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned
long addr, unsigned long len)
{
    if (!vma) {
#ifdef CONFIG_STACK_GROWSUP
        if (addr > sysctl_heap_stack_gap)
            vma = find_vma(current->mm, addr - sysctl_heap_stack_gap);
        else
            vma = find_vma(current->mm, 0);
        if (vma && (vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSUP))
            return false;
#endif
        return true;
    }

    if (addr + len > vma->vm_start)
        return false;

    if (vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN)
        return sysctl_heap_stack_gap <= vma->vm_start - addr - len;
#ifdef CONFIG_STACK_GROWSUP
    else if (vma->vm_prev && (vma->vm_prev->vm_flags & VM_GROWSUP))
        return addr - vma->vm_prev->vm_end >= sysctl_heap_stack_gap;
#endif

    return true;
}

(reformatted to prevent wrapping, the original code correctly uses tabs
for indentation)

> > If the latter, I think it wouldn't be good to see another
> > half-measure integrated to mainline, until the next mainline ASLR
> > defeat against which PaX has protected for over a decade. Just
> > my 2 cents.
> 
> The reason PaX isn't in the main kernel tree is that no one has
> spent the time and effort to actually submit it in a mergable form.
> So please, do so if you think this is something that is needed.
In 2010(-2011 ?), I pushed some bits of constification work from PaX to
mainline, nothing complicated.
Pushing from PaX to mainline some of the more useful bits that I listed
in a previous e-mail is a very different matter... well beyond the
amount of time I could devote to it - and beyond my technical abilities,
too.

However, pointing and pushing patches of lower complexity, why not.
For instance:
1) do you consider that using
static inline bool check_heap_stack_gap(const struct vm_area_struct
*vma, unsigned long addr, unsigned long len) {
return (!vma || addr + len <= vma->vm_start);
}
defined in include/linux/sched.h (where PaX defines that prototype, and
where most functions using it are defined) to replace those open-coded
(!vma || addr + len <= vma->vm_start) checks is a worthwhile, though
obviously no-op, cleanup in its own right ?

2) do you consider that, even before the integration of PaX's refcount
protection to mainline (which is there, like most of PaX, for security
reasons, there have been refcount-related holes in the past...),
switching to atomic_t for fs_struct.users,
pipe_inode_info.{readers,writers,files,waiting_writers},
kmem_cache.refcount (for SLAB and SLUB), tty_port.count,
tty_ldisc_ops.refcount is worthwhile ?
Most such refcounts at other places are already atomic, after all.

3) I see a patch in USB core, which looks like it's written to avoid
some potential integer overflows.
diff -NurpX linux-3.17.1-pax/Documentation/dontdiff
linux-3.17.1/drivers/usb/core/devio.c
linux-3.17.1-pax/drivers/usb/core/devio.c
--- linux-3.17.4/drivers/usb/core/devio.c    2014-10-05
21:52:19.775984000 +0200
+++ linux-3.17.4-pax/drivers/usb/core/devio.c    2014-10-05
21:54:24.336047472 +0200
@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ static ssize_t usbdev_read(struct file *
     struct usb_dev_state *ps = file->private_data;
     struct usb_device *dev = ps->dev;
     ssize_t ret = 0;
-    unsigned len;
+    size_t len;
     loff_t pos;
     int i;

@@ -229,22 +229,22 @@ static ssize_t usbdev_read(struct file *
     for (i = 0; nbytes && i < dev->descriptor.bNumConfigurations; i++) {
         struct usb_config_descriptor *config =
             (struct usb_config_descriptor *)dev->rawdescriptors[i];
-        unsigned int length = le16_to_cpu(config->wTotalLength);
+        size_t length = le16_to_cpu(config->wTotalLength);

         if (*ppos < pos + length) {

             /* The descriptor may claim to be longer than it
              * really is.  Here is the actual allocated length. */
-            unsigned alloclen =
+            size_t alloclen =
                 le16_to_cpu(dev->config[i].desc.wTotalLength);

-            len = length - (*ppos - pos);
+            len = length + pos - *ppos;
             if (len > nbytes)
                 len = nbytes;

             /* Simply don't write (skip over) unallocated parts */
             if (alloclen > (*ppos - pos)) {
-                alloclen -= (*ppos - pos);
+                alloclen = alloclen + pos - *ppos;
                 if (copy_to_user(buf,
                     dev->rawdescriptors[i] + (*ppos - pos),
                     min(len, alloclen))) {
Does that make sense ?


Bye,
Lionel.

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