Date: Sun, 23 Nov 2014 15:19:36 +0100 From: Bernhard Hermann <bernhard.hermann@...il.com> To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com Subject: Re: so, can we do something about lesspipe? (+ a cpio bug to back up the argument) I agree to both of you and to me it is an important issue. I don't want to be infected with malware while checking whether a file is malware :-( or my distro doing something in the background that I'm not even aware of. Unfortunately I don't feel like I'm up to the task. But I would be very glad if others (you two seem very qualified to me) would tackle these problems. If money can help with this I'd be willing to throw in a few dozen currency units to support this cause. (I hope that doesn't reduce intrinsic motivation?) br, BH On 23 Nov 2014 10:52, "Hanno Böck" <hanno@...eck.de> wrote: > On Sun, 23 Nov 2014 01:24:11 -0800 > Michal Zalewski <lcamtuf@...edump.cx> wrote: > > > WDYT? > > lesspipe is a tough one. > > First of all let me remind that I recently found an out of bounds > access in less's unicode decoding itself. Upstream is not responsing > atm. It's only a read error, but it was not even fuzzing, it was an > accidental finding, I'd expect that further analysis might yield to > more. > > > Now lesspipe: I didn't know that this thing exists until very > recently but I was aware that less did some kind of parsing and e.g. I > quite liked the idea that you can "less" gz/bzip2 files. > > Actually leaving security asside I quite like the idea of lesspipe, so > I'm reluctant to say "lesspipe scripts have gotta die / be disabled". > > That said the alternative is a tough one. It would be something > like this: > * Fuzz all the things in lesspipe > * Report what you find > * Kill the tools that have unsatisfying upstream reactions and replace > them with more secure ones. > And even after doing this this probably wouldn't count as a high > security solution. > > I'm aware this feels like a huge effort, but actually it fits very > well in the project I'm about to start anyway. And lesspipe gives a good > starting point to what tools might deserve some more fuzzing. > > cu, > -- > Hanno Böck > http://hboeck.de/ > > mail/jabber: hanno@...eck.de > GPG: BBB51E42 >
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