Date: Tue, 11 Nov 2014 02:38:09 +0100 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com> To: cve-assign@...re.org Cc: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com Subject: Re: CVE Request: Qt Creator fails to verify SSH host key Seems reasonable enough to me. I'll encourage the vendor to change practices, or to document that a generally expected practice is intentionally different for their use case. On Nov 10, 2014 7:14 PM, <cve-assign@...re.org> wrote: > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA1 > > > they don't check host keys when connecting, which makes a > > man-in-the-middle attack trivial. > > > // TODO: Mechanism for checking the host key. First connection to host: > save, later: compare > > > has received a bit more of a hesitant reaction. The most recent > > vendor feedback seems to indicate they're not super interested in > > implementing this. > > We don't feel that this is a fair characterization of the (public) > vendor response. There is a vendor response of: > > This was never considered much of an issue due to the scope > of our SSH support. The main use case is developers > communicating with their embedded devices that are locally > connected, typically via USB. Host key checking is of > limited value there, also because the same IP address is > often used for different devices. So the anticipated first > reaction from users would be "How do I turn it off?". > > This indicates that the current behavior is intentional behavior. The > vendor has made a tradeoff between what they perceive as a security > benefit and what they perceive as a support cost. We do not assign CVE > IDs based on third-party reports that a vendor should have made a > different tradeoff. Admittedly, the vendor might decide to change > their tradeoff later (e.g., if they obtain data indicating that USB > is actually not a prevalent use case). > > We agree that it would be nice to have a central place to track > findings such as "the SSH security expectations for this product are > different from the SSH security expectations for essentially every > other product." CVE is not that place. > > Similarly, there is an opportunity for security improvement if the > vendor were to implement key checking, even if the vendor insisted > that this would not be enabled by default. This type of opportunity > for security improvement cannot have a CVE assignment. > > - -- > CVE assignment team, MITRE CVE Numbering Authority > M/S M300 > 202 Burlington Road, Bedford, MA 01730 USA > [ PGP key available through http://cve.mitre.org/cve/request_id.html ] > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > Version: GnuPG v1.4.14 (SunOS) > > iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJUYP/lAAoJEKllVAevmvmsZIgH/1AjdVpx/gIRO5y0xTo76NQs > Kb+hC7AAXlBT/ySTfmsWOmTxBE9L77sze2vdt1mOZOLeFCkOmxIQDkBmkP3tlx4o > TawvLaebWa7e+RG15xLRhXcbUdXa9Fi4oBAMWNL7p+WN1VClh/wTl92EcyELrhp/ > iC22Wg9MaJKY7OGm4FuOghkwsM0L13tfoYvGNNsVOty2aWDopoMSzGU9mbvda/OB > FwW5KGzBRSD38HTBmwG8eaHWWTWmnHAiT/n4zL7jO7YG6L+ZoYhpUS3Mh/qStlWr > bgoXn7P6rlU+u+wPA/ZvSk3wWuLSh7623T+3dADJzeS4Ls1CG3bwi6u5kL8HyBA= > =lZ3n > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- >
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