Date: Thu, 16 Oct 2014 14:34:25 -0600 From: Kurt Seifried <kseifried@...hat.com> To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com Subject: Re: attacking hsts through ntp On 16/10/14 01:45 PM, Hanno Böck wrote: > Am Thu, 16 Oct 2014 09:56:06 -0600 > schrieb Kurt Seifried <kseifried@...hat.com>: > >> The obvious solution being to whitelist your site (in the >> chrome/firefox source code)if you truly care: > > No. > > While this is neat (and I already did this for my most important > domains) this won't help. > > The reason: HSTS preloaded sites are handled exactly the same way as > normal HSTS sites - they can expire. Chrome sets a maximum timeout for > HSTS of 1000 days for preloaded sites. That was elaborated in the talk > today. He demonstrated the attack on google mail which is in this > whitelist. Set clock 3 years into the future and youre done. I did not know that. One concern I have is also HSTS has no tools to manage them in browsers, at least when I last checked, has that changed? There is some room for DoS due to this on the client side. > It could be argued that it is wrong to expire preloaded HSTS sites. But > the very same attack applies to HPKP which basically has to expire, > because you don't want to use keys forever. If people say "I use HSTS, so much so that I want you to whitelist it IN the source code forever" I'm pretty sure they never want it to expire (at least that was my thought when I got my domains whitelisted). -- Kurt Seifried -- Red Hat -- Product Security -- Cloud PGP A90B F995 7350 148F 66BF 7554 160D 4553 5E26 7993 Download attachment "signature.asc" of type "application/pgp-signature" (820 bytes)
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