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Date: Fri, 26 Sep 2014 00:11:21 +0200
From: Hanno Böck <>
Subject: Re: nss RSA forgery (CVE-2014-1568)

On Thu, 25 Sep 2014 23:17:58 +0200
Hanno Böck <> wrote:

> Some more info, but not much:
> Initially I thought this is probably not such a big deal because the
> bleichenbacher attack requires e to be very small (like e=3 or e=4)
> and everyone uses e=65537 these days. But it seems I was wrong on
> that, lots of CAs still with e=3.

Correcing me: There are not lots of, but exactly 6.

Camerfirma_Chambers_of_Commerce_Root.pem: 3 (0x3)
Camerfirma_Global_Chambersign_Root.pem: 3 (0x3)
Digital_Signature_Trust_Co._Global_CA_1.pem: 3 (0x3)
Digital_Signature_Trust_Co._Global_CA_3.pem: 3 (0x3)
Go_Daddy_Class_2_CA.pem: 3 (0x3)
Starfield_Class_2_CA.pem: 3 (0x3)

Some background: having very small exponents for RSA isn't a problem if
you do everything right, but it vastly increases the likelyhood of
issues like this popping up. It'd seem like a good safeguard to get rid
of all e=3 keys.

Hanno Böck


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