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Date: Mon, 8 Sep 2014 22:25:56 +0300
From: Mikko Korpela <>
To: "" <>
Subject: Re: Re: Python robotframework - tmp vuln

Hi guys,

I didn't get what was the security issue.
Anyway I removed my little debug/test-program from the submodule so
you can relax now.

Please in the future if there are some concerns post them to the issue tracker.

Best Regards,
Mikko Korpela

2014-09-08 19:21 GMT+03:00 Kurt Seifried <>:
> On 08/09/14 09:22 AM, wrote:
>>> This is the first of many
>> The MITRE CVE team obviously has no objection to your use of the
>> oss-security list for raising new discussion topics such as the
>> likelihood that a '../tmp/ substring represents a security problem.
>> The comments below are only about obtaining CVE assignments from
>>> the reason I'm not assigning CVE's for these is this is a side project
>> A CVE isn't going to be possible without further analysis explaining
>> why a vulnerability exists in the specific case. There can't be an
>> expectation that someone at MITRE is already familiar with the
>> product, or will read and understand the complete source code as part
>> of processing an oss-security message.
>> Items that seem to be missing from the original message include:
>> 1, Is the "merge('../tmp/passing.xml', '../tmp/failing.xml')"
>>    debugging code, or is this code realistically used because a
>>    different piece of software has created passing.xml and failing.xml
>>    files?
> It's part of __main__ so it gets executed.
>> 2. If there is a realistic situation in which the
>>    "merge('../tmp/passing.xml', '../tmp/failing.xml')" executes, would
>>    the cwd realistically be a first-level directory such as the /root
>>    or /tmp directory?
> yes if you run from within /root or /tmp, the "run from /root" would be
> the obvious worry as it would indicate the root user is being used.
>> 3. For purposes of risk analysis, is unconstrained use of a ../tmp/
>>    pathname always equivalent to unconstrained use of a /tmp/ pathname?
> If it ends up using /tmp/ then I would say that's a problem. is it
> always a problem? I can't say.
>> A possible CVE assignment decision might be:
>> A. If a different product came with a test suite containing:
>>    test_program > /tmp/merged.xml
>> then it could have a CVE because /tmp/merged.xml might be a symlink to
>> an important file.
>> B. If the test suite were changed to:
>>    test_program > ../tmp/merged.xml
>> with no constraints, then it could still have a CVE, because some
>> people run test suites as root with a cwd of the /root directory.
>> C. If ../tmp/ is used in "debugging code" that is intended to be run
>> by a developer who understands the appropriate cwd, and this
>> "debugging code" is not a "test suite" for users, then there is no CVE
>> assignment. Admittedly, there might be cases where the distinction
>> between "debugging code" and "test suite" is completely ambiguous.
> --
> Kurt Seifried -- Red Hat -- Product Security -- Cloud
> PGP A90B F995 7350 148F 66BF 7554 160D 4553 5E26 7993

Mikko Korpela

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