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Date: Mon, 1 Sep 2014 19:43:58 +0000
From: mancha <mancha1@...o.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Cc: Werner Koch <wk@...pg.org>, pkg-gnupg-maint@...ts.alioth.debian.org
Subject: Re: gpg blindly imports keys from keyserver responses
On Mon, Sep 01, 2014 at 08:41:10PM +0200, Kristian Fiskerstrand wrote:
>
> My personal opinion is this is expected behavior as the keyservers are
> not trusted, and as you point out above, there are proper measures
> that should be used that invalidate this as an attack vector, i.e. by
> performing proper key verification.
Hi.
Isn't it the opposite? Were key servers fully trusted I'd agree
"expected behavior" would be to blindly import the server's reply.
However, the lack of trustworthiness of keyservers is precisely why the
check is relevant.
Note: it is not being suggested this check be considered a replacement
for full key verification. But, it is not unreasonable for a user to
expect when instructing gpg to import a key with FP 0xf00 that the gpg
binary is indeed importing a key with FP 0xf00.
--mancha
PS Thijs' email signature verified for me using mutt. What is your email
client-side configuration?
Content of type "application/pgp-signature" skipped
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