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Date: Tue, 22 Jul 2014 13:17:56 +0200
From: Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: Linux peer_cred Mischmasch
On 07/22/2014 12:15 PM, Sebastian Krahmer wrote:
> While maybe_add_creds() (via SOCK_PASSCRED) and scm_send()
> (via unix_{stream,dgram}_sendmsg()) use the real UID,
>
> cred_to_ucred() (via SO_PEERCRED) passes the EUID (this time
> also kuid_munged()).
There should also be a discrepancy regarding when the credentials are
captured (time of send for SOCK_PASSCRED, time of socket creation for
SO_PEERCRED). The latter is required because privileged processes
assume that they can safely write to stderr, so picking the current
process credentials may well introduce vulnerabilities.
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security
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