Date: Tue, 8 Jul 2014 22:34:48 GMT From: FreeBSD Security Advisories <security-advisories@...ebsd.org> To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com Subject: FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-14:17.kmem -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 ============================================================================= FreeBSD-SA-14:17.kmem Security Advisory The FreeBSD Project Topic: Kernel memory disclosure in control messages and SCTP notifications Category: core Module: kern, sctp Announced: 2014-07-08 Credits: Michael Tuexen Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD. Corrected: 2014-07-08 21:54:50 UTC (stable/10, 10.0-STABLE) 2014-07-08 21:55:27 UTC (releng/10.0, 10.0-RELEASE-p7) 2014-07-08 21:54:50 UTC (stable/9, 9.3-PRERELEASE) 2014-07-08 21:55:27 UTC (releng/9.3, 9.3-RC3-p1) 2014-07-08 21:55:27 UTC (releng/9.3, 9.3-RC2-p1) 2014-07-08 21:55:27 UTC (releng/9.3, 9.3-RC1-p2) 2014-07-08 21:55:27 UTC (releng/9.3, 9.3-BETA3-p2) 2014-07-08 21:55:27 UTC (releng/9.2, 9.2-RELEASE-p10) 2014-07-08 21:55:27 UTC (releng/9.1, 9.1-RELEASE-p17) 2014-07-08 21:54:50 UTC (stable/8, 8.4-STABLE) 2014-07-08 21:55:39 UTC (releng/8.4, 8.4-RELEASE-p14) CVE Name: CVE-2014-3952, CVE-2014-3953 For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories, including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the following sections, please visit <URL:http://security.FreeBSD.org/>. I. Background The control message API is used to construct ancillary data objects for use in control messages sent and received across sockets and passed via the recvmsg(2) and sendmsg(2) system calls. II. Problem Description Buffer between control message header and data may not be completely initialized before being copied to userland. [CVE-2014-3952] Three SCTP cmsgs, SCTP_SNDRCV, SCTP_EXTRCV and SCTP_RCVINFO, have implicit padding that may not be completely initialized before being copied to userland. In addition, three SCTP notifications, SCTP_PEER_ADDR_CHANGE, SCTP_REMOTE_ERROR and SCTP_AUTHENTICATION_EVENT, have padding in the returning data structure that may not be completely initialized before being copied to userland. [CVE-2014-3953] III. Impact An unprivileged local process may be able to retrieve portion of kernel memory. For the generic control message, the process may be able to retrieve a maximum of 4 bytes of kernel memory. For SCTP, the process may be able to retrieve 2 bytes of kernel memory for all three control messages, plus 92 bytes for SCTP_SNDRCV and 76 bytes for SCTP_EXTRCV. If the local process is permitted to receive SCTP notification, a maximum of 112 bytes of kernel memory may be returned to userland. This information might be directly useful, or it might be leveraged to obtain elevated privileges in some way. For example, a terminal buffer might include a user-entered password. IV. Workaround No workaround is available. V. Solution Perform one of the following: 1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date. 2) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch: The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable FreeBSD release branches. a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the detached PGP signature using your PGP utility. [FreeBSD 10.0] # fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-14:17/kmem.patch # fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-14:17/kmem.patch.asc # gpg --verify kmem.patch.asc [FreeBSD 8.4, 9.2 and 9.3-RC] # fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-14:17/kmem-89.patch # fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-14:17/kmem-89.patch.asc # gpg --verify kmem.patch.asc [FreeBSD 9.1] # fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-14:17/kmem-9.1.patch # fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-14:17/kmem-9.1.patch.asc # gpg --verify kmem.patch.asc b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root: # cd /usr/src # patch < /path/to/patch c) Recompile your kernel as described in <URL:http://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/kernelconfig.html> and reboot the system. 3) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch: Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64 platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility: # freebsd-update fetch # freebsd-update install VI. Correction details The following list contains the correction revision numbers for each affected branch. Branch/path Revision - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- stable/8/ r268432 releng/8.4/ r268435 stable/9/ r268432 releng/9.1/ r268434 releng/9.2/ r268434 releng/9.3/ r268433 stable/10/ r268432 releng/10.0/ r268434 - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the following command, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number, on a machine with Subversion installed: # svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number: <URL:http://svnweb.freebsd.org/base?view=revision&revision=NNNNNN> VII. References <URL:http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2014-3952> <URL:http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2014-3953> The latest revision of this advisory is available at <URL:http://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-14:17.kmem.asc> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2 iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJTvHEtAAoJEO1n7NZdz2rnbRcP+gJ9CIH2kch1kXgs94McM1L+ uSnUQsv30OQFe/J//q65HUINVwCMwyRZRFZ238sVsJ6jpft6UTaDxDSdJAqR2opi hew/KEYYQhrrFXCHAgyaXh7Ph1B9URBJ5/MOkDWIBYOei3bxPZRP4ordrtclq/bA qFRvov9gXUah6imbnRMvmC68tzt9v7I/vE2VwsC9fE/yL25IvP5ZunEATegOm4IQ w+fk2VB/6GNFbTsWW1aR6FM60mWXVj2uJfHenEG1K381AXXQb4lSzo8E2SsdkI3B x+MJkxBhNrpSm6tV/zndtYRoDtFseuTHBjKxe7liTyJcFuztkZqmdHaNzbeBSVON P/fIqMHt2f143028ZZZEFqHzuqiEWrWB3WcgQnfsp3HrhMPnhnwkfo8TuC5NiKYx 6CsdnWLdPb1ix9RqX4MqnbFBHDKCoK28nuCKcxJB/OXanikGzcIBazpLsqFmTcm6 9bZ79zuMWU7wiU8p5qdGURmjTJQx9eF5UHcyfIPX6wZLyx8WVltbF5zVJa0nw0LC OEf5KmmgEbPhfdkJ5R2UyHffwQDCNs+vixNLRSJS9/D/6lczT8qPxpDEkjQCsSKw YxmLubDOjnqR57yrh4kKEj2V5ZJcRu2G1q1EKdLfD98VJOrot8p4qa4sCL+o9sbw nII906M+PVUAnsa9synp =nTZs -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
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