Date: Fri, 27 Jun 2014 10:35:33 -0600 From: "Vincent Danen" <vdanen@...hat.com> To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com Cc: cve-assign@...re.org Subject: Re: Question regarding CVE applicability of missing HttpOnly flag On 06/26/2014, at 10:00 AM, Kurt Seifried wrote: > On 26/06/14 05:45 AM, Jamie Strandboge wrote: >> Based on this email and the one this is in response to, I find this >> comment unclear. Is MITRE saying that: >> >> a) lack of implementing SELinux, AppArmor, virus scanner, firewall, >> <insert hardening software here> does not justify a CVE because of >> the complexity? b) lack of implementing SELinux, AppArmor, virus >> scanner, firewall, <insert hardening software here> does not >> justify a CVE and also cannot be considered an implementation error >> because of the complexity? c) implementing SELinux, AppArmor, virus >> scanner, firewall, and/or <insert hardening software here> is not >> worth it because the added complexity intrinsically makes the >> system less secure? d) something else? >> >> Thanks > > So one comment on this, replace the above with "DAC" > (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Discretionary_access_control) and I bet > we'd hand it a CVE =). > > Security lines move, I would expect most modern system of any type > (Windows, Linux, router, maybe not my bathroom scale that talks > wifi... yet) to have some sort of firewall enabled by default and not > simply leave everything exposed to the world. So in that case not > having a fire enabled by default would definitely violate the > principle of least surprise and maybe even qualify for a CVE. Wait. You're saying that not having a firewall enabled by default qualifies for a CVE? I mean, firewalls are pretty common sense and should definitely be used/available/whatever but to say that an operating system or device doesn't have a firewall enabled by default should have a CVE assigned seems... excessive, doesn't it? How is not having a firewall enabled by default a _vulnerability_? If we look at it this way, it's a good thing CVEs go past 9999 per year because we need to change everything we used to call "hardening" to be a vulnerability, do we not? -- Vincent Danen / Red Hat Product Security Download attachment "signature.asc" of type "application/pgp-signature" (711 bytes)
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