Date: Tue, 17 Jun 2014 12:16:55 +0000 From: Xen.org security team <security@....org> To: xen-announce@...ts.xen.org, xen-devel@...ts.xen.org, xen-users@...ts.xen.org, oss-security@...ts.openwall.com CC: Xen.org security team <security@....org> Subject: Xen Security Advisory 100 (CVE-2014-4021) - Hypervisor heap contents leaked to guests -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Xen Security Advisory CVE-2014-4021 / XSA-100 version 3 Hypervisor heap contents leaked to guests UPDATES IN VERSION 3 ==================== Public Release. CVE assigned. ISSUE DESCRIPTION ================= While memory pages recovered from dying guests are being cleaned to avoid leaking sensitive information to other guests, memory pages that were in use by the hypervisor and are eligible to be allocated to guests weren't being properly cleaned. Such exposure of information would happen through memory pages freshly allocated to or by the guest. Normally the leaked data is administrative information of limited value to an attacker. However, scenarios exist where guest CPU register state and hypercall arguments might be leaked. IMPACT ====== A malicious guest might be able to read data relating to other guests or the hypervisor itself. Data at rest in guest memory or storage (filesystems) is not affected. However, it is possible for an attacker to obtain modest amounts of in-flight and in-use data, which might contain passwords or cryptographic keys. VULNERABLE SYSTEMS ================== Xen 3.2.x and later are vulnerable. Xen 3.1.x and earlier have not been inspected. MITIGATION ========== No comprehensive mitigation is available. An attacker will find it easier obtain sensitive data from a victim guest if the attacker is able to initiate domain management operations and lifecycle events for that guest. This includes a situation where the attacker can cause the victim guest to crash. Therefore the risk from this vulnerability can be somewhat reduced by restricting management (such as migration or resource adjustment) to fully trusted guest or host administrators, and by eliminating any Denial of Service vulnerabilities against potential victim guests. CREDITS ======= This issue was discovered by Jan Beulich. RESOLUTION ========== Applying the attached patch resolves this issue. xsa100.patch xen-unstable, Xen 4.4.x, Xen 4.3.x, Xen 4.2.x, Xen 4.1.x Note that to avoid a regression on systems with AMD IOMMU, on 4.2.x and later additionally commit 6b4d71d0 ("AMD IOMMU: don't free page table prematurely") found at http://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb/?p=xen.git;a=commitdiff;h=6b4d71d028f445cba7426a144751fddc8bfdd67b will be required if not already in place in the respective tree. $ sha256sum xsa100*.patch 2cbd3a52bb8d32d00a19e2ce48e3157034b484b4a7b7282cae0d108ffb4ddca0 xsa100.patch $ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.12 (GNU/Linux) iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJToCoFAAoJEIP+FMlX6CvZ8p0H/1RPfzKOIQVvjJrAPiOH8cDr /QR8hAhKqIs97+fxSFO5LCsfBwKga/rLz6sjveQYlvJOq9qSc2vTWxpQLNrh7M1q NagTSVJoxcxVn+LHgHAczfRfNwK5BWFHz5/R3k1SLSjLy15aBDr5rW42H/WjKXI3 0UnLfpLkaDfocpQOYAz1a4cTAxbK07omhSlnCdcvPmWLDPvWy03BF7jZvTDYdiO1 OjU/3HUwMv7Ii6By3QvjO3Z4h9qkest/iIeaeCTwNwSJa9rW+8KLZjzdJCMJOUeu J608R94x4vyj7wc+JVPwD59K0XkXzmsASC8q0ivohXGDTloKcdN7vdmR37g4fJ0= =WnYZ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Download attachment "xsa100.patch" of type "application/octet-stream" (927 bytes)
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