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Date: Thu, 01 May 2014 08:22:56 -0400
From: Daniel J Walsh <>
To:, Solar Designer <>
CC: Steve Grubb <>
Subject: Re: local privilege escalation due to capng_lock as
 used in seunshare

On 05/01/2014 12:23 AM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Wed, Apr 30, 2014 at 8:06 PM, Solar Designer <> wrote:
>> On Thu, May 01, 2014 at 06:43:10AM +0400, Solar Designer wrote:
>>> On Wed, Apr 30, 2014 at 09:27:10PM -0400, Steve Grubb wrote:
>>>> And switching to NO_NEW_PRIVS broke the sandbox:
>>>> So, perhaps fixing SECURE_NOROOT is the safest bet? Are there any other
>>>> opinions on this?
>>> If SECURE_NOROOT is meant to be usable to run entire Linux distros
>>> (whether "on host" or/and "in containers"),
>> Actually, I think it won't work well for that unless the distro in
>> question doesn't use any SUID root programs that need capabilities,
>> because SECURE_NOROOT breaks the raising of capabilities for SUID root
>> exec (on purpose).  So generic implementations of containers capable of
>> running arbitrary Linux distro userlands are probably not making use of
>>> then it must not have an
>>> effect of excluding UID 0 from "appropriate privileges" for setuid(2).
>>> Do we know reliably that in this case excluding UID 0 from "appropriate
>>> privileges" for setuid(2) was an effect specifically of SECURE_NOROOT?
>> Per my quick greps, this does not appear to be the case.  The only
>> checks for SECURE_NOROOT that I could find are in cap_bprm_set_creds(),
>> so SECURE_NOROOT should affect execve(2), but not setuid(2).
>> Why are we talking about it in this context, then?
> I think that SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP is actually at fault here.  And I
> don't see how changing its semantics would help -- it's not safe to
> run setuid programs without granting them capabilities, and it's not
> really safe to grant them capabilities without setting euid == 0, and
> it seems like it's unsafe to grant capabilities and euid == 0.
> This leaves granting no extra privileges at all to setuid programs,
> which is exactly what no_new_privs does.  seunshare sets up a weird
> mount namespace, and anyone can use it and *configure* things about
> that namespace.  no_new_privs blocks anything that causes execve to
> grant new privileges, so the whole point is that it's safe to do
> non-posixy things that are inherited by children as long as
> no_new_privs is set.
> I think I correctly analyzed exactly how no_new_privs broke sandbox in
> the rhbz bug:
> The short answer is that selinux doesn't currently distinguish whether
> labels on executables are granting or removing privilege, and selinux
> also fails to distinguish between the right to change labels on
> request and the right to change labels because the policy said so [1],
> so no_new_privs takes the conservative approach and blocks the whole
> transition-on-exec mechanism.  And sandbox fails.  I suspect that
> sandbox is already broken in the case where the program being
> sandboxed is on a nosuid mount, because selinux's nosuid behavior is
> weird.
> In any event, I think that seunshare can be fixed by using dyntransition. Ugh.
> A better fix might be to rewrite seunshare to use user namespaces
> instead of requiring permissions.  This won't fly on RHEL5/6, though.
> --Andy
I don't have a problem allowing the dyntransition, since  the only thing
the code does after the transition is exec the app, As long as the
cleanup process stays in the previous label it should work.

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