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Date: Tue, 08 Apr 2014 14:33:10 -0600
From: "Vincent Danen" <vdanen@...hat.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: OpenSSL 1.0.1 TLS/DTLS hearbeat information
disclosure CVE-2014-0160
On 04/08/2014, at 13:37 PM, Yves-Alexis Perez wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 08, 2014 at 06:17:57PM +0300, Jussi Eronen wrote:
>> Hello,
>>
>> On 04/08/2014 01:05 AM, Yves-Alexis Perez wrote:
>>> On Mon, Apr 07, 2014 at 01:56:27PM -0700, Reed Loden wrote:
>>>> Was this not coordinated with the distros at all? If not, that
>>>> seems like major fail on the reporters and NCSC-FI's part. :/
>>>
>>> There was a mail from Red Hat on monday morning (CEST) with no
>>> detail and a CRD to april 9th. It seems OpenSSL advisory came a
>>> bit uncoordinated, actually, which (it seems) triggered the release
>>> of the heartbeat and cloudfare posts, as well as the Red Hat one
>>> here.
>>
>> We reported the issue to OpenSSL a couple of hours before the advisory
>> was published. Our plan was to start notifications to distros and
>> other vendors after discussing with OpenSSL. Codenomicon did mention
>> us as the coordinator in the original text of heartbleed.com, but the
>> current text reflects the situation quite well:
>>
>> """
>> Who coordinates response to this vulnerability?
>>
>> NCSC-FI took up the task of reaching out to the authors of OpenSSL,
>> software, operating system and appliance vendors, which were
>> potentially affected. However, this vulnerability was found and
>> details released independently by others before this work was
>> completed. Vendors should be notifying their users and service
>> providers. Internet service providers should be notifying their end
>> users where and when potential action is required.
>> """
>
> Thanks for the clarification. I suppose nobody knows who are those
> “others” who released independently?
>
> I think it might help to provide a full timeline of this. Here are the
> bits I know about, feel free to complete the missing bits:
>
> Sometimes (when?) : Neel Mehta of Google Security discovers the
> vulnerability
> Later (when?) : Google Security notifies OpenSSL
> Sometimes last week : someones (who? OpenSSL?) notifes CloudFlare
> (and maybe other vendors)
OpenSSL did not tell CloudFare. It is unclear who did.
> Mon, 07 Apr 2014 guess : Mark Cox of OpenSSL (but also working at Red
> Hat SRT) notifies Red Hat and authorizes them
> to share details of the vulns
> Mon, 07 Apr 2014 05:56 : Huzaifa Sidhpurwala (RH) add a bug to Red Hat bugzilla
> Mon, 07 Apr 2014 06:10 : Huzaifa Sidhpurwala sends a mail to distros
> list with no details but an offer to request
> them privately
> Mon, 07 Apr 2014 ~15:30: NCSC-FI reports issue to OpenSSL
> Mon, 07 Apr 2014 16:53 : Fix is committed to OpenSSL git (not sure if it
> was public or private at that point)
At this point it was private.
> Mon, 07 Apr 2014 : someone (who?) releases something (what, where?)
> Mon, 07 Apr 2014 17:27 : OpenSSL releases advisory
> Mon, 07 Apr 2014 18:00 : CloudFlare posts blog entry
> Mon, 07 Apr 2014 19:00 : Heartbleed.com is published
> Wed, 09 Apr 2014 : initial CRD
>
> At that point, we (Debian) started some kind of “public situation room”
> on #debian-security and we tried to build updates ASAP, along with
> trying to find more info on this (for example, I'm still unsure how easy
> it really is to find some valuable data in those 64kB of process heap
> memory).
>
> I have to admit the handling of that vulnerability was really not the
> best disclosure I could find, whatever Cloudfare is thinking about this.
>
> It seems that some people where actually knowing about this quite early
> because of their proximitity with involved projects (Google Security,
> OpenSSL project, Red Hat Security), which I consider pretty normal. But
> no effort was apparently made to coordinate something at that point,
> until crash mode was activated sometimes on april 7th (which might have
> been the best thing to do if someone noticed it was exploited in the
> wide, but since we didn't get that kind of information we can only
> speculate)
>
> I don't want to point finger, but I sincerely hope the next time
> something like that happens, coordination will be done early in the
> processus, and relevant vendors will have a chance to prepare themselves
> with a bit more than a two-days warning (or no warning at all). And I do
> know it's not always easy to identify a relevant group of vendors, but
> even when it's too late, coordinated disclosure and unique/authoritative
> information point is really helpful for everyone.
>
> Regards,
> --
> Yves-Alexis Perez
--
Vincent Danen / Red Hat Security Response Team
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