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Date: Wed, 19 Mar 2014 15:33:15 -0400 (EDT)
From: cve-assign@...re.org
To: meissner@...e.de
Cc: cve-assign@...re.org, oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: CVE Request: rack-ssl rubygem: XSS in error page

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> https://github.com/josh/rack-ssl/commit/9d7d7300b907e496db68d89d07fbc2e0df0b487b

> Handle bad URIs gracefully.
> 
> Some adapters (i.e. jruby-rack) will pass through bad URIs, then display
> the resulting exception. This creates an attack vector for XSS attacks.

Use CVE-2014-2538.

The basis of this CVE assignment is that the rack-ssl product is
apparently accepting some level of responsibility for the behavior of
adapters. The commit message in 2013 wasn't really worded in the form
of a vulnerability-fix announcement. There's another interpretation in
which it would be categorized as security hardening to work around XSS
vulnerabilities in adapters. The commit message mentions jruby-rack.
https://github.com/jruby/jruby-rack/blob/master/History.txt includes
"1.1.12 (28/11/12) ... refactored / updated error handling ... unify
exception handling across decorating app factories with support for
configuring exception handling with the *jruby.rack.error* option."
Perhaps this means that jruby-rack is less likely to have a patch that
makes XSS impossible because the jruby-rack developers want exception
handling to be fully configurable? In any case, an additional CVE
assignment for jruby-rack could be made if the jruby-rack developers
want one. That might, for example, cover the case of using jruby-rack
with an unpatched version of rack-ssl.

- -- 
CVE assignment team, MITRE CVE Numbering Authority
M/S M300
202 Burlington Road, Bedford, MA 01730 USA
[ PGP key available through http://cve.mitre.org/cve/request_id.html ]
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