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Date: Mon, 03 Feb 2014 01:13:06 -0700
From: Kurt Seifried <kseifried@...hat.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: Re: OpenSSH J-PAKE vulnerability (no cause for
panic! remain calm!)
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On 01/29/2014 06:50 AM, cve-assign@...re.org wrote:
> Use CVE-2014-1692. The CVE description will indicate that the
> issue requires an unusual installation.
>
>> As I understand it this can be enabled via code edit/gcc command
>> line options, so not sure if this qualified for a CVE or not
>> (vuln in code, yes, is code reachable? not under any default
>> setup, and even on non-default you have to go pretty far off to
>> enable it).
>
> An impact on the default installation isn't necessary.
> Vulnerabilities that occur only after the user modifies code aren't
> eligible for a CVE. However, if there's some type of "installation
> option" mentioned by the vendor, someone may have chosen that
> option, and it may be worthwhile to track the issue with a CVE. The
> nature of an "installation option" obviously varies widely across
> both open-source and closed-source products.
>
> In this case, there's:
>
>> http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/cvsweb/src/usr.bin/ssh/Makefile.inc
>
>> Add support for an experimental zero-knowledge password
>> authentication method using the J-PAKE protocol ...
>
>> This is experimental, work-in-progress code and is presently
>> compiled-time disabled (turn on -DJPAKE in Makefile.inc).
>
>> http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/cvsweb/~checkout~/src/usr.bin/ssh/Makefile.inc?rev=1.41;content-type=text%2Fplain
>
>> #CFLAGS+= -DJPAKE
>
> This is close to the edge of what "installation option" means, but
> our feeling is that the vendor wouldn't have provided that #CFLAGS
> line at all unless it were expected that an end user might want to
> make the one-character change.
Just to close this email thread, Mitre assigned one:
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2014-1692
- --
Kurt Seifried Red Hat Security Response Team (SRT)
PGP: 0x5E267993 A90B F995 7350 148F 66BF 7554 160D 4553 5E26 7993
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