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Date: Thu, 9 Jan 2014 20:51:15 +0100
From: Guido Berhoerster <>
Subject: Re: Re: CVE request: tmux local denial of service

* Florian Weimer <> [2014-01-09 20:06]:
> On 01/09/2014 07:44 PM, wrote:
> >Hash: SHA1
> >
> >>allows users to override the socket path using the -S command line option.
> >
> >We'd like to consider this ineligible for a CVE unless there's new
> >information. In many cases, "ability to cause an inconvenience" is not
> >sufficient for a CVE assignment. The nature of the application
> >apparently makes it unlikely that this would, for example, disrupt
> >unattended root-executed scripts that have a hardcoded tmux command
> >line.
> I reported this here because tmux is sometimes used to start servers
> on system boot:

In that case the right thing to do is setting TMPDIR to a
directory only writable by the user (TMPDIR/-S/-L are documented
in the manpage so this can hardly count as suprising to users).
The development version also supports TMUX_TMPDIR in which
sockets are created without a subdirectory and which e.g. may be
The Debian patch makes tmux potentially less secure due to being
setgid and it was rejected by upstream, see
In 2011 Debian reverted to the upstream behavior and no longer
carries the patch referenced in the above bug report.
Guido Berhoerster

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