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Date: Thu, 21 Nov 2013 00:55:13 -0700
From: Kurt Seifried <kseifried@...hat.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com, xen-announce@...ts.xen.org,
xen-devel@...ts.xen.org, xen-users@...ts.xen.org
CC: "Xen.org security team" <security@....org>
Subject: Re: Xen Security Advisory 78 - Insufficient TLB flushing
in VT-d (iommu) code
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
On 11/20/2013 10:08 AM, Xen.org security team wrote:
> Xen Security Advisory XSA-78
>
> Insufficient TLB flushing in VT-d (iommu) code
>
> ISSUE DESCRIPTION =================
>
> An inverted boolean parameter resulted in TLB flushes not
> happening upon clearing of a present translation table entry.
> Retaining stale TLB entries could allow guests access to memory
> that ought to have been revoked, or grant greater access than
> intended.
>
> IMPACT ======
>
> Malicious guest administrators might be able to cause host-wide
> denial of service, or escalate their privilege to that of the
> host.
>
> VULNERABLE SYSTEMS ==================
>
> Xen 4.2.x and later are vulnerable. Xen 4.1.x and earlier are not
> vulnerable.
>
> Only systems using Intel VT-d for PCI passthrough are vulnerable.
>
> MITIGATION ==========
>
> This issue can be avoided by not assigning PCI devices to untrusted
> guests on systems supporting Intel VT-d.
>
> NOTE REGARDING LACK OF EMBARGO ==============================
>
> This issue was disclosed publicly on the xen-devel mailing list.
>
> RESOLUTION ==========
>
> Applying the attached patch resolves this issue.
>
> xsa78.patch Xen 4.2.x, Xen 4.3.x, xen-unstable
>
> $ sha256sum xsa78*.patch
> 2b858188495542b393532dfeb108ae95cbb507a008b5ebf430b96c95272f9e0e
> xsa78.patch $
Please use CVE-2013-6375 for this issue.
- --
Kurt Seifried Red Hat Security Response Team (SRT)
PGP: 0x5E267993 A90B F995 7350 148F 66BF 7554 160D 4553 5E26 7993
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