Date: Wed, 13 Nov 2013 08:37:22 -0800 From: Tim <tim-security@...tinelchicken.org> To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com Subject: Re: Microsoft Warns Customers Away From RC4 and SHA-1 On Wed, Nov 13, 2013 at 11:09:10AM -0500, Eric H. Christensen wrote: > On Wed, Nov 13, 2013 at 07:57:51AM -0800, Tim wrote: > > > I'm inclined to agree. The question I suppose is, like DES (and > > > 3DES/MD5) at what point do we start assigning CVE's for some of this? > > > thoughts and comments welcome. > > > > Using a weak encyption algorithm alone isn't a sufficient condition to > > issue a CVE against software, since often the context of the usage > > matters a lot. If you use MD5 or SHA-1 for password hashing (with > > lots of salt and rounds), then there's no vulnerability. If you use > > them for HMACs, then there's also likely no problem. But if you use > > them for a signature with a public key, there is. > > It's answers like this that make it difficult for non-security-literate system administrators to make good decisions. I completely understand and agree with what you wrote but I wonder if we're making it harder for people to understand how to protect themselves. > > After having many similar conversations with people that manage systems I find that it's usually easier to say "MD5 bad, SHA-256 good" and then just walk away. Perhaps some sort of chart should be published that allows people to make better decisions? Oh sure, I totally agree with you. But sysadmins and programmers don't make the decisions on when to assign a CVE. My recommendation here applies to security people trying to decide whether or not to call the baby ugly. Once the CVE is published (with a description of actual risk) , sysadmins can just apply the patch. tim
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