Date: Thu, 17 Oct 2013 09:28:41 -0700 From: Dwayne Litzenberger <dlitz@...tz.net> To: pycrypto@...ts.dlitz.net, python-crypto@...hon.org, oss-security@...ts.openwall.com Subject: CVE-2013-1445 python-crypto: PRNG not correctly reseeded in some situations In PyCrypto before v2.6.1, the Crypto.Random pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) exhibits a race condition that may cause it to generate the same 'random' output in multiple processes that are forked from each other. Depending on the application, this could reveal sensitive information or cryptographic keys to remote attackers. An application may be affected if, within 100 milliseconds, it performs the following steps (which may be summarized as "read-fork-read-read"): 1. Read from the Crypto.Random PRNG, causing an internal reseed; 2. Fork the process and invoke Crypto.Random.atfork() in the child; 3. Read from the Crypto.Random PRNG again, in at least two different processes (parent and child, or multiple children). Only applications that invoke Crypto.Random.atfork() and perform the above steps are affected by this issue. Other applications are unaffected. Note: Some PyCrypto functions, such as key generation and PKCS#1-related functions, implicitly read from the Crypto.Random PRNG. == Technical details == Crypto.Random uses Fortuna to generate random numbers. The flow of entropy looks something like this: /dev/urandom -\ +-> "accumulator" --> "generator" --> output other sources -/ (entropy pools) (AES-CTR) - The "accumulator" maintains several pools that collect entropy from the environment. - The "generator" is a deterministic PRNG that is reseeded by the accumulator. Reseeding normally occurs during each request for random numbers, but never more than once every 100 ms (the "minimum reseed interval"). When a process is forked, the parent's state is duplicated in the child. In order to continue using the PRNG, the child process must invoke Crypto.Random.atfork(), which collects new entropy from /dev/urandom and adds it to the accumulator. When new PRNG output is subsequently requested, some of the new entropy in the accumulator is used to reseed the generator, causing the output of the child to diverge from its parent. However, in previous versions of PyCrypto, Crypto.Random.atfork() did not explicitly reset the child's rate-limiter, so if the child requested PRNG output before the minimum reseed interval of 100 ms had elapsed, it would generate its output using state inherited from its parent. This created a race condition between the parent process and its forked children that could cause them to produce identical PRNG output for the duration of the 100 ms minimum reseed interval. == Demonstration == Here is some sample code that illustrates the problem: from binascii import hexlify import multiprocessing, pprint, time import Crypto.Random def task_main(arg): a = Crypto.Random.get_random_bytes(8) time.sleep(0.1) b = Crypto.Random.get_random_bytes(8) rdy, ack = arg rdy.set() ack.wait() return "%s,%s" % (hexlify(a).decode(), hexlify(b).decode()) n_procs = 4 manager = multiprocessing.Manager() rdys = [manager.Event() for i in range(n_procs)] acks = [manager.Event() for i in range(n_procs)] Crypto.Random.get_random_bytes(1) pool = multiprocessing.Pool(processes=n_procs, initializer=Crypto.Random.atfork) res_async = pool.map_async(task_main, zip(rdys, acks)) pool.close() [rdy.wait() for rdy in rdys] [ack.set() for ack in acks] res = res_async.get() pprint.pprint(sorted(res)) pool.join() The output should be random, but it looked like this: ['c607803ae01aa8c0,2e4de6457a304b34', 'c607803ae01aa8c0,af80d08942b4c987', 'c607803ae01aa8c0,b0e4c0853de927c4', 'c607803ae01aa8c0,f0362585b3fceba4'] == Solution == The solution is to upgrade to PyCrypto v2.6.1 or later, which properly resets the rate-limiter when Crypto.Random.atfork() is invoked in the child. == Files == PyCrypto v2.6.1 may be downloaded from the PyCrypto website, from PyPI, or using your operating system's package manager or ports tree. The official tarball has the following SHA256 sums: f2ce1e989b272cfcb677616763e0a2e7ec659effa67a88aa92b3a65528f60a3c *pycrypto-2.6.1.tar.gz c2ab0516cc55321e6543ae75e2aa6f6e56e97432870f32a7799f3b89f467dc1b *pycrypto-2.6.1.tar.gz.asc The git repository is here: https://github.com/dlitz/pycrypto/ The v2.6.1 tag id is: ebb470d3f0982702e3e9b7fb9ebdaeed95903aaf The v2.6.1 commit id is: 7fd528d03b5eae58eef6fd219af5d9ac9c83fa50 For informational purposes, patches against pycrypto v2.6 and v2.1.0 are attached. Distributors patching older versions of the library, please remember to run the test suite before releasing a modified package: # From the source tree python setup.py build test # After installation python -m Crypto.SelfTest.__init__ == Thanks == Thanks to Yves-Alexis Perez and Sebastian Ramacher for helping to coordinate the release of this fix. == References ==  N. Ferguson and B. Schneier, _Practical Cryptography_, Indianapolis: Wiley, 2003, pp. 155-184.  https://www.dlitz.net/software/pycrypto/ or http://www.pycrypto.org/ -- Dwayne C. Litzenberger <dlitz@...tz.net> OpenPGP: 19E1 1FE8 B3CF F273 ED17 4A24 928C EC13 39C2 5CF7 View attachment "CVE-2013-1445-pycrypto2.6.patch" of type "text/x-diff" (13972 bytes) View attachment "CVE-2013-1445-pycrypto2.1.0.patch" of type "text/x-diff" (10454 bytes) Download attachment "signature.asc" of type "application/pgp-signature" (223 bytes)
Powered by blists - more mailing lists
Please check out the Open Source Software Security Wiki, which is counterpart to this mailing list.
Confused about mailing lists and their use? Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia and check out these guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.