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Message-Id: <E1VUFLt-0002yY-AA@xenbits.xen.org> Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2013 12:28:25 +0000 From: Xen.org security team <security@....org> To: xen-announce@...ts.xen.org, xen-devel@...ts.xen.org, xen-users@...ts.xen.org, oss-security@...ts.openwall.com CC: Xen.org security team <security@....org> Subject: Xen Security Advisory 71 (CVE-2013-4375) - qemu disk backend (qdisk) resource leak -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Xen Security Advisory CVE-2013-4375 / XSA-71 version 2 qemu disk backend (qdisk) resource leak UPDATES IN VERSION 2 ==================== Public release Fix patch header corruption in xsa71-qemu-xen-unstable.patch. ISSUE DESCRIPTION ================= The qdisk PV disk backend in the qemu-xen flavour of qemu ("upstream qemu") can be influenced by a malicious frontend to leak mapped grant references. IMPACT ====== A malicious HVM guest can cause the backend domain to run out of grant references, leading to a DoS for any other domain which shares that driver domain. VULNERABLE SYSTEMS ================== Any system which is using the qemu-xen qdisk backend for HVM guests is vulnerable. qemu-xen and qdisk are exposed by systems using libxl from Xen 4.2.0 onwards. In Xen 4.2.0 qemu-xen was a non-default option, from Xen 4.3.0 onwards qemu-xen is the default. Xen 4.1.0 exposes qdisk via libxl but does not support qemu-xen and therefore is not vulnerable. The xend toolstack has never supported qdisk as a disk backend and therefore such systems are not vulnerable. Upstream qemu is vulnerable from version 1.1 onwards. MITIGATION ========== This vulnerability can be avoided by using a different block backend (e.g. blkback or blktap2) or by using the qemu-xen-traditional version of qemu. Users of the xl toolstack, see docs/misc/xl-disk-configuration.txt for information on forcing the use of a particular disk backend and xl.cfg(5) for information on forcing the use of qemu-xen-traditional. Systems which only run PV guests and/or run HVM guests without PV drivers are not vulnerable. CREDITS ======= This issue was discovered by Coverity Scan and Matthew Daley. RESOLUTION ========== Applying the appropriate attached patch resolves this issue. xsa71-qemu-xen-unstable.patch xen-unstable, Xen 4.3.x xsa71-qemu-xen-4.2.patch Xen 4.2.x $ sha256sum xsa71*.patch a3f667e251a32fa5eff4a78eae49acd020b2f340fb203dc08a033d43841b0a2a xsa71-qemu-xen-4.2.patch f5ec607babb01dc8f8065dfe121882af4c3d93c035bafbfed48825dea684d6d9 xsa71-qemu-xen-unstable.patch $ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.12 (GNU/Linux) iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJSVp1bAAoJEIP+FMlX6CvZ8nMH/1sMYLD38viMSIJndL3Nlfz4 cj5AaTHyPIYaX3RzLZfM08+qeRIcXcPDAcNwaYn97IOv0JJ/gppfNOeCdmHGvWhl z88vKbzI0RaDv3pL+eKo7RiGN/T32gsh6H4ltjrNGyO0LiDI4rfbxTBjVlzE8bB8 M4weAWtgEa7/VAYeM4g7cOoCD7goE15lYLSRsrQJGn/iizLdL/I+IqSvTaGwgE+I yKvl7wJ1fEfy9sKCTls9INZdMnJXmlC4+Pq8phmW9QoSSIxNFqRDZ13IduXHbpXe xyeAr7U5b5GzPtGclu6XX0vyuOct2mf984xHbe06ecJF2KjsXi44spszPP2elHQ= =hcxy -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Download attachment "xsa71-qemu-xen-4.2.patch" of type "application/octet-stream" (1624 bytes) Download attachment "xsa71-qemu-xen-unstable.patch" of type "application/octet-stream" (1617 bytes)
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