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Date: Tue, 6 Aug 2013 19:38:27 +0200
From: Oleg Nesterov <>
        Petr Matousek <>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <>,
        Andy Lutomirski <>,
        David Howells <>
Subject: [PATCH 0/1] (Was: CLONE_NEWUSER local DoS)

On 08/06, Oleg Nesterov wrote:
> On 08/06, Petr Matousek wrote:
> >
> > spender reported [1] a local DoS triggerable by unprivileged user when
> > user namespaces are enabled (CONFIG_USER_NS).
> >
> >   [1]

I see nothing related there, so the patch lacks Reported-by.

Who is reporter?

> > Reproducer:
> >
> > b836010000bb00000010cd80ebf2 is for(;;)unshare(1<<28);
> What happens? OOM?

Yes, this leaks the memory, the patch seems to fix the problem.

> I'll recheck, but at first glance this is simple, unshare_userns()
> populates new_cred which is not freed by bad_unshare_cleanup_fd
> if create_user_ns() fails. And create_user_ns() _should_ fail (iiuc)
> when CLONE_NEWUSER is called for the second time and later due to
> !kuid_has_mapping().
> I'll send the patch, but perhaps there is something else. Eric?

Eric, Andy, the patch looks trivial, but it would be nice if you
can ack/nack. I am sending it to lkml.


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