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Date: Tue, 9 Jul 2013 13:18:09 +0200
From: Marcus Meissner <>
To: Kurt Seifried <>
Cc: Alan Coopersmith <>,, Sebastian Krahmer <>,
Subject: Re: [] Re: Question about CVE for
	X!! DoS

On Fri, Jul 05, 2013 at 11:12:22PM -0600, Kurt Seifried wrote:
> On 07/05/2013 09:22 PM, Alan Coopersmith wrote:
> > On 07/ 5/13 01:50 PM, Kurt Seifried wrote:
> >> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1
> >> 
> >> 
> >>
> >> 
> >> Lists no CVE? I assume it needs one, or did upstream handle
> >> this?
> > 
> > Upstream discussion, including reps from both Red Hat & SuSE,
> > determined it didn't need a CVE, since it can only be triggered by
> > a client authorized to connect to the Xserver (via xauth, xhost,
> > etc.) and such a client, by design, can lock all other clients out
> > from the server, kill clients, etc.
> > 
> > It would be like wanting a CVE for the fact that another process
> > running under your UID can kill your process.
> > 
> > Not sure why SuSE decided to go ahead and release it as a security
> > fix anyway - it's certainly a bug fix though.
> Yeah that's what had me confused. I would classify this as security
> hardening (good to fix, but no trust boundary gets crossed), not a
> security vulnerability. Was wondering if it had been found to be worse
> or something.

I checked this and we had opened a security bug as the bug initially
arrived at xorg_security... We did not untag it for security so
it went to our process with the incorrect tagging and no CVE.

I see that we missed to record the follow up discussion which was
probably the reason for that.

Sorry for the confusion.

Ciao, Marcus

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