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Date: Tue, 04 Jun 2013 12:43:20 -0600
From: Kurt Seifried <kseifried@...hat.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
CC: Vincent Danen <vdanen@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: CVE request: libsrtp buffer overflow flaw

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On 06/04/2013 09:51 AM, Vincent Danen wrote:
> A buffer overflow flaw was reported in libsrtp, Cisco's reference 
> implementation of the Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP),
> in how the crypto_policy_set_from_profile_for_rtp() function
> applies cryptographic profiles to an srtp_policy.  This could allow
> for a crash of a client linked against libsrtp (like asterisk or
> linphone).
> 
> A pull request in git has a patch to correct this issue (doesn't
> look like it's been merged into master yet though).
> 
> References:
> 
> http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2013/Jun/10 
> https://github.com/cisco/libsrtp/pull/26 
> https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=970697

Please use CVE-2013-2139 for this issue.

> As an aside, when I was poking around in github, I also found this
> but I don't know anything about libsrtp so I don't know if this is
> something that can be triggered by a remote user or if this is just
> a hardening thing, but the commit message is "Security fix to not
> ignore RTCP encryption, if required."
> 
> https://github.com/cisco/libsrtp/commit/8ad50a05279b61a382da3cc730ff1560ab4272e8
>
> 
> 
> Is there someone more familiar with libsrtp that might be able to 
> comment on whether or not this is a flaw (so can a remote user
> request to disable encryption and do ... something?)



- -- 
Kurt Seifried Red Hat Security Response Team (SRT)
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