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Date: Wed, 22 May 2013 01:08:36 -0600
From: Kurt Seifried <kseifried@...hat.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
CC: Tomas Hoger <thoger@...hat.com>, Jan Lieskovsky <jlieskov@...hat.com>,
        "Steven M. Christey" <coley@...us.mitre.org>,
        Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>,
        Ian Weller <ianweller@...oraproject.org>
Subject: Re: CVE Request (minor) -- Python 3.2: DoS when matching
 certificate with many '*' wildcard characters {was: CVE Request
 (minor) --  python-backports-ssl_match_hostname: Denial of service when matching
 certificate with many '*' wildcard characters }

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Hash: SHA1

On 05/20/2013 01:21 PM, Tomas Hoger wrote:
> On Wed, 15 May 2013 19:51:38 -0600 Kurt Seifried wrote:
> 
>> On 05/15/2013 05:28 AM, Jan Lieskovsky wrote:
> 
>>> Replying to myself here. Issue is present in Python 3.2 code
>>> too - so the CVE should be allocated for the original (Python
>>> 3.2) code, rather than to python-backports-ssl_match_hostname
>>> package.
> 
> ...
> 
>> Please use CVE-2013-2099 for this issue.
> 
> There should be no need for two separate CVEs for this issue. 
> Problematic match_hostname was developed in Python 3.  As its 
> functionality is needed by Python 2 users, and it is not provided
> by the standard library, Python 3 implementation was made available
> via different module.  It's the same code, packaged in python (3.x)
> and python-backports-ssl_match_hostname packages.  The same CVE
> should apply to both.
> 
> Given that CVE-2013-2099 was assigned to Python 3 ssl,
> CVE-2013-2098 seems like the one to reject as dupe.


My reasoning here was that Python 2 and 3 constitute "forked" or
separate code bases, so fall under CVE SPLIT.evidence includes:

1) Python 2to3, a lot of Python code needs work to move from 2 to 3
2) This feature was added as standard in Python 3 and then later back
ported to 2

Steve, can we get a referees decision here? Thanks.

- -- 
Kurt Seifried Red Hat Security Response Team (SRT)
PGP: 0x5E267993 A90B F995 7350 148F 66BF 7554 160D 4553 5E26 7993
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