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Date: Sat, 18 May 2013 23:03:45 -0600
From: Kurt Seifried <kseifried@...hat.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
CC: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>, Gilles Chehade <gilles@...lp.org>,
        misc@...nsmtpd.org
Subject: Re: Re: CVE Request: DoS in OpenSMTPD TLS Support

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Hash: SHA1

On 05/18/2013 09:00 PM, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
> On Sat, May 18, 2013 at 6:16 PM, Gilles Chehade <gilles@...lp.org>
> wrote:
>> Not too nice to send a CVE request without ANY coordination with
>> us ...
> 
> Sorry about that. I was in the midst of bumping packages in gentoo
> to the snapshot where you had fixed the issue, when I figured it
> might be wise to also get the issue tracked with a CVE asap. Sorry
> for jumping the gun.

For future reference you can get CVEs privately, although if you're
not the official upstream this means there is a greater chance of
duplicates (and thus of me saying "no, make a public request). So if
you want to do this a possible compromise is to email me and the
upstream and if upstream replies that it's ok then I'd probably go ahead.

>> Just for the record, you contacted us today reporting a bug which
>> could be memory corruption and you didn't know if it could be
>> exploited.
> 
> The quote was "I haven't looked into why this happens or if memory 
> corruption / code execution is a possibility, but at the very
> least, it's a nasty DoS."
> 
>> The snapshot mail, commit log and diffs makes the issue obvious
> 
> Which is why I figured it was already a public issue, and
> therefore not an issue to track it with a CVE. But apologies,
> nonetheless, for jumping the gun. I'll coordinate with you more
> closely in the future.

Agreed, generally with public source code commits fixing an issue we
consider it public and in general I would assign a CVE publicly,
otherwise it gets to complicated to track/ensure embargoes/etc.

- -- 
Kurt Seifried Red Hat Security Response Team (SRT)
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