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Date: Mon, 6 May 2013 10:33:38 -0600
From: Vincent Danen <vdanen@...hat.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: CVE request: OpenVPN use of non-constant-time memcmp in HMAC
comparison in openvpn_decrypt
Could a CVE be assigned to this issue? Copying and pasting from the
upstream announcement:
Exploit summary
OpenVPN 2.3.0 and earlier running in UDP mode are subject to chosen
ciphertext injection due to a non-constant-time HMAC comparison
function. Plaintext recovery may be possible using a padding oracle
attack on the CBC mode cipher implementation of the crypto library,
optimistically at a rate of about one character per 3 hours. PolarSSL
seems vulnerable to such an attack; the vulnerability of OpenSSL has not
been verified or tested.
Severity
OpenVPN servers are typically configured to silently drop packets with
the wrong HMAC. For this reason measuring the processing time of the
packets is not trivial without a MITM position. In practice, the attack
likely needs some target-specific information to be effective.
The severity of this vulnerability can be considered low. Only if
OpenVPN is configured to use a null-cipher, arbitrary plain-text can be
injected which can completely open up this attack vector.
Affected versions
OpenVPN 2.3.0 and earlier are vulnerable. A fix (commit
f375aa67cc) is included in OpenVPN 2.3.1 and later.
References:
https://community.openvpn.net/openvpn/wiki/SecurityAnnouncement-f375aa67cc
https://github.com/OpenVPN/openvpn/commit/11d21349a4e7e38a025849479b36ace7c2eec2ee
https://bugs.gentoo.org/show_bug.cgi?id=468756
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=960192
--
Vincent Danen / Red Hat Security Response Team
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