Date: Mon, 29 Apr 2013 14:40:00 -0600 From: Kurt Seifried <kseifried@...hat.com> To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com CC: Simon McVittie <smcv@...ian.org> Subject: Re: CVE(-2007-xxxx?) request: telepathy-idle does not check SSL certificates -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 04/29/2013 01:37 PM, Kurt Seifried wrote: > On 04/24/2013 08:35 AM, Simon McVittie wrote: >> In versions prior to 0.1.15, telepathy-idle, an IRC backend for >> the Telepathy framework, does not check the server's SSL/TLS >> certificate for validity. A network intermediary could use >> this flaw to carry out man-in-the-middle attacks on IRC users. > >> This flaw has existed, and been flagged in the source code, >> since at least 2007 (the year in which telepathy-idle moved from >> Sourceforge to freedesktop.org). I don't know whether that means >> it should get an ID of the form CVE-2007-xxxx? > >> The upcoming version 0.1.15 will fix this vulnerability. > >> Versions 0.1.11 to 0.1.14 (which use GLib for TLS) carried out >> some cursory checks on the certificate, but did not check that >> the issuer was a trusted CA, that the identity matched the >> server's hostname, or that the certificate had not expired. A >> minimal patch to correct this is to delete the call to >> g_socket_client_set_tls_validation_flags() (this will make one >> regression test fail). > >> Versions 0.1.10 and older (which use OpenSSL for TLS) do not >> have any support for certificate verification at all. > > In general if you support SSL the assumption is you do it sanely, > e.g. verify certificates/hostnames/etc, because if not the whole > thing is useless since an attacker can MitM you easily (generally > the thing SSL is designed to stop). So worthy of a CVE generally. > > Please use CVE-2013-2025for this issue. Oops cut and paste the wrong one, obviously CVE-2013-2025 is for the Ushahidi Web XSS (bug 1009). Please use CVE-2007-6746 for the telepathy SSL verification flaw. > >> Regards, S > >>  https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=63810  "TODO >> sometime in the future implement certificate verification" > > > > > - -- Kurt Seifried Red Hat Security Response Team (SRT) PGP: 0x5E267993 A90B F995 7350 148F 66BF 7554 160D 4553 5E26 7993 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.13 (GNU/Linux) iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJRftqgAAoJEBYNRVNeJnmTg9QP/RRHjoiznsm/74+jT6caBy8Z 2nip9e9HvFM0z72I6lazQjcGPbrdKeoOyVVcOx9AHQyoU9xqBDYGi8nsO+XHFE1m sXD0TLBnPsH7EdkPOHxT+OEV2ABnx8QatKfvTI2GIENAmgW3WEJvUwaEL7rUOzZf aHjyPm/j9tergeqqXG8zMGkRWSU6Gvqn75yViD3ayJwTYXKKSCcWv5Iyex23P3Ug 42IIiBm0V1GMX+gcepdbL4ImB9SI89+ena/7KPknEqKzN2GS5oTjBcBGvRxPgiXu mNX8Y3NWdHPdaykHdQKswSzIwGLDUktIIFREBsl/pOkSZMDrjSIT3AlNmomFPBup jouAip1Q2fTpGB/kvn7LPkxqPr2mymjR6o549GyJkliBwGiRzNeo4xwBhzB1fD7s 39YVJ7VSce408507+o35D4uQD8fiYcY93qwI30qOklPVJgT+M/ntfS7QBaJtjo5w mfOrdi/KLCwm37K5c5tMt31PMHV+IZ3AES7R2JAffX3Xl/44VjEQyhC85ekvwH5W ubprGmOhqd+qtU9YFYaIIdeah9dc7k0CPeP20UyLxdELNceL+zxhQ38YA6t1KLKz iPDV9VLZn1+0EVC251WWTqEVSX4HGUxgtiOvAdUY3K3vAa74wdHdquOOhvDVroXz nle83CkOn7S86LvT7fTn =OCtO -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
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