Date: Fri, 26 Apr 2013 11:47:27 +0200 From: Dag-Erling Smørgrav <des@....no> To: kseifried@...hat.com Cc: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com, Alistair Crooks <agc@...src.org>, Josh Bressers <bressers@...hat.com> Subject: Re: upstream source code authenticity checking Kurt Seifried <kseifried@...hat.com> writes: > Dag-Erling Smørgrav <des@....no> writes: > > This is exactly the logic used by web browsers to justify scaring > > users away from https sites that haven't payed the Verisign tax... > Huh? That makes no sense. There's at least one free CA that has a root > cert in most browsers (http://cert.startcom.org/). I'm sorry but your > comment in this context doesn't appear to make any sense. I wasn't aware of StartCom. I've been using CACert, which is not included in browsers. My point was that browsers go to great lengths to prevent users from visiting sites that use self-signed certificates, or certificates signed by a CA which the browser does not know / trust, but will happily let users submit forms on unencrypted sites without even a warning. This is the same "no security is better than imperfect security" logic. DES -- Dag-Erling Smørgrav - des@....no
Powered by blists - more mailing lists
Please check out the Open Source Software Security Wiki, which is counterpart to this mailing list.
Confused about mailing lists and their use? Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia and check out these guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.