Date: Wed, 24 Apr 2013 22:19:15 -0400 From: "Eric H. Christensen" <sparks@...hat.com> To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com Subject: Re: upstream source code authenticity checking -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 On Sun, Apr 21, 2013 at 12:39:39AM +0400, Solar Designer wrote: > i just found this recent blog post by Allan McRae of Arch Linux: > > http://allanmcrae.com/2012/04/how-secure-is-the-source-code/ This is a great article and I really appreciate the work that went into the research. > I think that placing both "MD5 checksum provided on same site as > download" and "PGP signature, key difficult to verify" in the same > "yellow" category is inconvenient for us. "MD5 checksum provided on > same site as download" only helps verify downloads from mirrors against > the master site, whereas "PGP signature, key difficult to verify" > achieves a lot more - once a distro is already including the package > (and has already taken the risk of it having been tampered with), then > verifying further updates to the package becomes almost as reliable as > it would have been with proper signing (with a "readily verifiable" key). > So we need four categories, or simply "MD5 checksum provided on same > site as download" should be in "red", not in "yellow". This is a good discussion to have. I've recently started working on "best practices" articles at Red Hat and feel this would make an excellent article on how we can all improve the security of our source code that inevitably gets pushed into the various distributions. What is really the best, most proper way of desiminating releases? I really don't like the use of MD5 for checksums (I'd prefer something out of the SHA-2 or SHA-3 family of hashing algorithms) and I really *do* like the use of PGP for signing the code. I do foresee some practices within the use of PGP that might not be great, though. So what is the best way of authenticating the source code? - --Eric - -------------------------------------------------- Eric "Sparks" Christensen Red Hat, Inc - Product Security Team sparks@...hat.com - sparks@...oraproject.org 097C 82C3 52DF C64A 50C2 E3A3 8076 ABDE 024B B3D1 - -------------------------------------------------- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.13 (GNU/Linux) iQGcBAEBCgAGBQJReJKfAAoJEB/kgVGp2CYvKFUL/RP5T8bQd6gnZiduldsgBPLd 07k/7VNB5shjtaaweKRRBahJ780ELusJ5bYSKsJxFkPkWBu+JR3A/ilz0VINMdR8 jhPXpXUiBC5VsK3DIBe+MgQkXcnRBPZ751X1ENAEyf3qIKK54Wr2+UgMcLg9Wf3U FPemO3bcW2A6kEfyAvt1yrjatuR2bTg8xjDACE07ly7JodqwlpFrYC9zgS331SF0 y+SRdV+vhCcBQ10AE4Ho81xfHpTvfBT1Odyzn5KYgFRePYMmLgCiUHwaJ9nb+nJR 0pcZmj40ZSK/DTWuO8bgp/0xoNRKqFmL5Imn1may4HTmFuc02kExE6b2+MKxKO6H FhJVnPRrXAV2nxcjRNG6loUYA49wSUtfrxXelMX2KtYUBEZccs6P5VtA4sBFOAqv SYk9pJ+kyzCjHzcXpnQdEixJD/RnjP0FukcY5W59V/3hvJVD0lyi5aLmHS7D0dIb RtoqU4fPu++x7MIMkdgxlLZQYY5RzVwSuYKx8Ynftw== =WovK -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
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